

PRELIMINARY VERSION: PLEASE DO NOT QUOTE

Compensation, Austerity, and Populism:

Social Spending and Voting in 17 Western European Countries

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Note: This is a work-in-progress. In the next version, the empirical analysis will be substantially revised.

Abstract

Economic integration, and policies that accompany it, may improve aggregate social welfare but create both winners and losers. Comprehensive social policies to compensate potential losers may be an important precondition for public support for European integration, and for related policy measures. However, many western European countries reduced spending on income maintenance after 1990; the Eurozone debt crisis led to further cuts to social services. We evaluate the impact of levels of social spending, as well as of austerity measures, on public support for populist parties. We examine a panel of 187 elections from 1990-2017 and analyze pooled cross-sectional data from eight waves of the European Social Survey. We find evidence that populist parties fare worse where countries spend more on social support, and where spending has not been reduced from historical levels. At the same time, in countries that spend less on income maintenance, and/or have decreased spending from earlier levels, populist vote shares are consistently higher, and the likelihood of supporting populist parties greater. This relationship holds when controlling for a range of individual and macroeconomic factors, including occupational and educational characteristics, unemployment, economic growth, and immigration rates. The growing strength of populist political parties is rooted in a complex set of long-term economic, social, and cultural factors, but appropriate social policies may moderate their appeal.

The past twenty years have seen a striking increase in support for European populist parties of the right and left. In 1998, populist parties drew support from less than 10% of European citizens. Only two capitals on the continent—Bratislava and Bern—had populist politicians serving in government.¹ Twenty years later, populist parties receive 24% of votes in national parliamentary elections across Europe and serve in eleven different governments; they are part of the pro-government bloc, but not in government, in four others (Heinö 2019).² These parties draw their support disproportionately from members of the white male working class, particularly blue-collar workers with modest educational backgrounds who have experienced a relative decline in their economic condition and social status over the past few decades (Gidron and Hall 2019 and 2017; Gest 2016; Inglehart and Norris 2016; Bornschier and Kriesi 2012; Oesch 2008; Kriesi et al. 2006).

There are major differences among European populist movements, of the Right and the Left. All of them, however, share an antagonism to existing mainstream political parties and political institutions. And all of them, in different ways, are skeptical of or hostile to central aspects of European integration. Some, especially on the Left in debtor countries, oppose austerity measures they see as imposed by European institutions. Others, especially on the Right, resent European policies toward refugees, asylum-seekers, and immigration generally. Still others are more broadly concerned that the European Union and the international trading system have eroded too much of their nations' sovereignty.

¹ See "How populism emerged as an electoral force in Europe," *The Guardian*. Nov. 20, 2019. Accessible at <https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2018/nov/20/how-populism-emerged-as-electoral-force-in-europe>

² See the Authoritarian Populism Index. Accessible at < <https://populismindex.com/>>

Analyses of the upsurge in populist sentiment in Europe – and elsewhere – have often focused on two sources. Some emphasize the cultural, ethnic, or traditionalist bases of populist sentiment and rhetoric (Norris and Inglehart 2019). Others focus on the impact of economic distress, both due to international economic trends and to automation (Anelli et al. 2019; Colantone and Stanig 2018a and b; Rodrik 2018). There is clear evidence of both material and non-material sources of populism. We do not propose to re-hash a tired debate between proponents of two sets of forces that are clearly not mutually exclusive, and that almost certainly interact with one another. We do argue that social policies – in particular, both the level and rates of change in social spending – have had an impact on the appeal of populism.

In this paper, we address a question that is raised, in particular, by findings that economic distress tends to stimulate populism: do government policies to mitigate the impact of negative economic trends actually *work* to reduce political discontent, and in particular the form of discontent that leads to populist voting? This is a variant of the “compensation hypothesis,” which has been a stalwart of political economy for decades. The idea is sometimes tied particularly economic integration, but we mean it in a more general sense. The basic proposition is simple: the political backlash against economic trends and policies that have a negative impact on some in society can be mitigated with policies that *compensate* the losers for their losses. In some variants, the argument has a more normative cast and is connected to the goal of pursuing policies that benefit society as a whole but that also have significant distributional effects. In such circumstances, Pareto improvements are available: because, by definition, the aggregate social welfare impact of the policy is positive, even after compensation, both winners and losers are better off. Of course, the winners rarely are enthusiastic to engage in such compensation – and yet it exists, often for long-standing historical reasons. We do not take so strong a position as

to suggest that compensation is always in pursuit of aggregate welfare improvements. Our argument is more limited, that whatever the broad impact of the policy or trend in question, inasmuch as it harms some segments of the population, measures to reduce that harm will also reduce the likelihood that those harmed turn to populist political parties.

Scholars have argued that compensation mechanisms facilitated the opening of industrial economies to the world economy in the aftermath of World War II. The logic of compensation suggests equally that countries with well-developed mechanisms of social compensation for citizens facing economic difficulties, whatever their source – broad and deep social welfare states – should experience less of a populist backlash than those lacking in such mechanisms. However, with some exceptions, there have been few attempts to evaluate whether this expectation has been borne out over the past twenty years.³

A related question has to do with the imposition of austerity measures. These policies typically *reduce* the depth and breadth of the social safety net, typically in response to fiscal or balance-of-payments difficulties. Justified or not, the compensation hypothesis suggests that cutting back on the willingness or ability of the state to compensate those harmed by economic distress is likely to *increase* political discontent.

We therefore carry out some tests of the impact of social policies in western European countries, all of which have been hit by severe economic shocks in the past twenty years and most of which have experienced growth in populist sentiment and voting. We ask whether the different levels of social spending in these countries affect the extent to which their citizens increase their voting for populist political parties. As another side of the same coin, we ask

³ Notable exceptions include Swank and Betz 2003, who examine the pattern from 1981-1998, Walter 2010, and Gingrich 2019 who looks at whether compensatory spending conditions support for populist parties among the workers most vulnerable to automation.

whether *reductions* in social spending have been associated with an increase in populist voting. Both of these evaluations get at the same broad theoretical construct: that government attempts to mitigate the impact of economic hardship on less fortunate members of the population reduce their tendency to support populist politicians.

We find evidence that higher expenditures on social welfare predicts lower populist vote shares, controlling for other factors. From a panel analysis of 187 national-level election results, we show that where governments have maintained more generous welfare regimes, and cut benefits less dramatically, populist parties are less successful electorally. While deindustrialization is associated with a clear increase in populist vote shares, additional labor market spending appears to partially mitigate these pressures.

That austerity and welfare reform may have contributed to the strength of populist parties is also supported by our analysis of pooled survey data from the European Social Survey. Here, we find that higher levels of social expenditures, and increases in spending over time, predict a lower likelihood that a respondent will have supported a populist party in the previous election. We estimate that a one percentage point decrease in spending on social services leads to a 25% greater likelihood of a voter supporting a populist party, controlling for country and year fixed effects and occupational and educational differences across countries (0.103 to 0.129). The marginal effect of labor market spending is even larger: an additional one percentage point of GDP dedicated to unemployment benefits or labor market activation predicts a 50% reduced likelihood of voting for a populist party (0.10 to 0.048).

The observational nature of our analysis does not allow us to make definitive causal claims about the relationship between social expenditures and support for populist parties. However, the consistency of the observed relationships across multiple time frames and

measures of social spending, and the robustness of the results over a range of model parameters and controls, does suggest that welfare retrenchment may have contributed to the success of populist parties. While long-term economic, social, and cultural changes are undoubtedly the underlying forces behind growing support for populist parties, welfare regimes mediate people's experience of these developments. By lessening the effects of these factors on livelihoods, compensation may reduce the extent of grievances and, in doing so, limit the appeal of populist political parties, including those skeptical of European integration.

The paper is structured as follows. A first section provides a theoretical account of why levels of social spending, and changes in these levels, might affect political support for populist parties, along with an overview of the recent pattern of labor market and other social expenditures. The second section addresses definitional issues with regards to populism and describes the data we use. The third section evaluates the theoretical expectations empirically, by examining a panel of 187 election results and analyzing pooled cross-sectional survey data from eight waves of the European Social Survey. A fourth section discusses some of the implications of these findings and concludes.

I. Theory: The relationship between compensation and populism

Many trends and policies that create aggregate economic benefits also produce winners as well as losers: they typically have both welfare effects and distributional effects. In many cases, the concerns of real or expected losers are often more intense than the support of winners, which raises questions as to how welfare-improving policies with substantial distributional effects ever get undertaken at all. For decades, scholars of comparative and international political economy have asked just this question, in particular wondering what might make economic integration

politically feasible in democratic political systems. Scholars noted that more open economies tend to have larger governments, and surmised that this is due to the greater need to compensate those threatened by the uncertainties caused by the vagaries of the world economy (Cameron 1978; Rodrik 1998). In an influential series of country studies and a summary volume (Katzenstein 1985), Peter Katzenstein examined the small open economies of western Europe. He showed that they were largely forced by the fact that their small size made economic openness a necessity to devise comprehensive social safety nets to protect their citizens from the potential harms that openness might bring.

The “compensation hypothesis” that grew out of this work is simple, and has much broader implications than those associated with economic integration. Workers and others faced with economic and social changes – of whatever origin -- that threaten to undermine their livelihood are likely to oppose governments that attempt to impose these changes. Especially where the changes in question are seen by governments as desirable, they have incentives to offer substantive compensation to those who anticipate being on the losing side of the changes. The cost of compensation may be high, but presumably the government values the broader economic benefits more highly, so that the political consensus purchased with compensation is worth the cost.

The empirical expectation that flows from the compensation hypothesis is that opposition to unpopular trends and policies can be mitigated with compensation. Certainly, that opposition will also vary with other domestic and international conditions, but all else equal the more extensive and reliable is the social safety net, the less fearful citizens should be about socio-economic change.

In Europe one of the unifying features of populist parties of the left and right is scepticism about aspects of European integration. This is unquestionably due to the perception – and, perhaps, the reality – that European economic and political integration is forcing policies on national publics that are resented by segments of their societies. If appropriate social policies can dampen this resentment, we would expect that support for populism will be lower where compensation is higher, all other things equal.

This thesis already has found some support in the literature. In one of the first studies of whether welfare states moderated support for rightwing populist parties, Swank and Betz (2003) concluded that countries with more generous—and universalistic—welfare systems had less successful right-wing populist parties, and that welfare spending reduced the linkage between economic integration and growing support for these parties. More recent studies have also found some evidence that compensation can moderate support for populist parties. In an examination of three recent elections to the European Parliament, Halikiopoulou and Vlandas (2016), find that where labor market protections were weak, unemployment bolstered support for right-wing populist parties. However, where protections were stronger, there was no association between higher unemployment and increased support for far-right parties. Finally, in a recent study of the Finns, the most successful rightwing populist party in Finland, Patana (2018) finds that support is weaker in regions receiving higher amounts of EU structural funding.⁴

A related issue is the impact of *reductions* in existing social programs. As Esping-Andersen (1990) observed thirty years ago, a defining feature of the postwar European welfare state was the aspiration to “decommodify” labor or minimize the extent to which an individual’s material welfare

⁴ Gingrich (2019), however, finds evidence that compensation has inconsistent effects on support for right-wing populist parties. In a study focused on workers most affected by automation, she concludes that compensation shores up support for both the mainstream left *and* far right parties.

depended on the marketplace. While such a lofty goal was never fully achieved anywhere, and the extent to which it was pursued varied across welfare regimes, by the 1960's many western Europe countries had enacted policies that made it possible for many workers to exit the market without a substantial loss of income (Korpi and Palme 2003). The slowdown in growth in the 1970's, and the significant rise of unemployment, led to strains on a compensatory model premised on high levels of employment. However, initially, the political response was to make it easier to receive benefits — to relax conditions for receiving unemployment, injury, or disability benefits, and to subsidize early retirement to facilitate socially-responsible labor shedding (Ibid: 429). By the late 1990's, economic inactivity rates in some countries were as high as 65% for men aged 55-64— in large part because of the availability of long-term unemployment benefits and pre-retirement pensions (Ebbinghaus 2006).

Ongoing employment and fiscal crises led organizations such as the OECD and EU to advocate labor market reforms that would replace income maintenance and early retirement policies with spending aimed at activation: policies facilitating employment, retraining, or job search to facilitate higher workforce participation (Garrizmann 2017 et al.; Kenworthy 2010; Clegg 2007; Armingeon 2007). The goal of such policies was no longer to decommodify workers but to “mobilise, preserve, and improve their working capacities and skills” so as to increase their market-based income (Garrizmann et al. 2017: 37). Countries pursued various paths toward this reform, with some accompanying cuts with expanded public employment and new investments in education and retraining that produced more socially-embedded processes of liberalization, others creating a dualized labor market that preserved substantial compensatory expenditures for labor market insiders, and still others pursuing a mostly deregulatory model that cut benefits without providing new support for activation (Thelen 2014; Van Kersbergen and Hemerijck 2012; Emmenegger et al. 2012; Bonoli 2010; Iversen and Wren 1998). However,

across nearly every country, we observe a narrowing of compensatory policies seen as creating “disincentives” to work, and a subsequent decrease in the rates of economic inactivity. On top of this, a number of countries have enacted austerity programs in recent years, either because of conditions for receiving financial bailouts during the Euro-crisis or as self-imposed reforms to decrease debt (Hermann 2014).

<Figure 1 about here>

As can be seen in Figure 1 detailing the longitudinal trend in unemployment-adjusted labor market spending across 12 western European countries⁵, in the majority of countries, there has been a reduction in labor market support since the late 1990’s, particularly spending focused on income maintenance (“passive LMP”). Over the same period, most countries also weakened unemployment protections, by reducing income replacement rates and reducing the length of benefits (Korpi and Palme 2003: 434). In 1975, the average replacement rate of unemployment insurance in the OECD was 65% in 1975; by 1995, it had fallen to 55% (Ibid). Since the beginning of the 21st century, replacement levels have fallen even further. In 2001, a childless single adult living in the EU, and earning the national average wage, would have received around 43% of their previous earnings after 18 months of unemployment. In 2018, the replacement rate was more than a quarter lower—just 31% under the same conditions.⁶

⁵ Values reflect the percent GDP spent on passive and active labor market policies divided by the current unemployment rate. This allows us to compare the level of expenditures adjusted for the short-term economic cycle and differences in the structural unemployment rate of different countries.

⁶ Calculated for a single person without children who has been out of work for 18 months. The total does not include housing benefits. Data from the OECD, “Net Replacement Rates in Unemployment,” accessible at <https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=NRR#>

A simple, but powerful observation from the welfare state literature predicts that those benefiting from social policies will seek to use the political process to protect their benefits. Scholars of the welfare state have consistently shown that welfare recipients are politicized by cuts or threatened cuts to their benefits, leading them to punish politicians who pursue retrenchment (Kurer et al. 2018; Campbell 2003; Pierson 1996). Recent studies of European austerity programs offer some support to the thesis that welfare cuts may have fueled support for populist parties. In a detailed longitudinal study that draws upon extensive individual-level data, Dal Bó et al. (2018) find that Swedes who faced relative income declines as a result of welfare cutbacks were over-represented among the supporters of the Sweden Democrats. Fetzer (2019) finds that austerity measures played a significant role in stimulating support for Brexit in the United Kingdom. Insofar as this dynamic extends to other countries, we can imagine that those who have been negatively affected by welfare cuts will resent the mainstream parties which enacted these policies and become more likely to support outsider parties as a form of protest.

Cuts to traditional welfare policies such as unemployment or early retirement may have had a particularly strong effect. Unlike the supporters of center parties, center right parties, and green parties, who prioritize spending on “social investment” over spending on “social consumption,” populist voters – whether on the left or the right – prefer the opposite arrangement; they prioritize welfare spending on unemployment or pensions over retraining programs or childcare assistance designed to increase labor force participation (Häusermann et al. 2019; Garritzmann et al. 2018; Häusermann 2018). When rightwing populist parties have been in coalition governments, they have acted on these preferences, seeking to expand the income maintenance programs at the core of the traditional welfare state, while reducing expenditures on social investment programs meant to expand and mobilize skills as well as

means-tested social assistance seen as disproportionately benefiting immigrants (Swank and Betz 2018). Consequently, where countries have engaged in more extensive cuts to unemployment and other income maintenance programs— we expect to find a particularly strong relationship between social spending and populist voting.

II. Defining Populism and Measuring Social Expenditures

The word populism has been used to describe a wide range of social movements and political programs. While its origins lie in the radical agrarian movements of the 19th century United States (Kazin 1998), the term is now widely used to describe a variety of European political parties outside of the political mainstream (Müller 2017; Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017). The term populist can also refer to the political strategies or even discursive styles of non-populist leaders or parties (Bonikowski and Gidron 2016). This heterogeneity notwithstanding, all populist parties share a number of common characteristics. Nearly all scholars agree that populist parties organize politics around an antagonistic division between citizens and elites that pits the common people in a moral battle against the elites ((Mansbridge et al. 2019). In the European context, populist parties of the left and right share two other common features. Nearly all populist parties are opposed to key aspects of European integration (Halikiopoulou et al. 2012). And nearly all European populist parties now draw disproportionate support from the traditional male working class, which has seen its relative position decline as a result of European integration and globalization (Gidron and Hall 2017; Bornschieer and Kriesi 2012; Oesch 2008; Lubbers et al. 2002). For these reasons, we follow other scholars in examining together populist parties of the left and the right and conceiving of support for these parties as a

reaction against processes of globalization and European integration that are widely viewed as benefiting elites at the expense of common people (e.g. Rodrik 2018).

To categorize populist parties, we use the *PopuList*, an overview of populist parties developed by a consortium of political scientists, which has been widely used by academics and journalists.⁷ This categorization overlaps in many instances with separately generated lists of radical parties; however, important differences can be found. For instance, traditional communist populist parties would count as leftwing and radical but not populist, while Italy's Five Star Movement would be considered populist but not radical, given its ideological fluidity. In this paper, we focus on populist parties, and all of the models use populism as the dependent variable. However, we also run all of the models using radical parties as the dependent variable, in most instances, finding similar results. *A full list of political parties classified as populist and/or radical is provided in Appendix 3.*

The OECD's Social Expenditures Database serves as the primary source of information for welfare spending.⁸ The OECD provides reliable information on social expenditures that go back to the early 1990's in most western European countries, making possible a cross-national comparison that extends over the time period of interest. To evaluate our compensation hypotheses, we examine separately three different measures of social expenditures, each reported as a percentage of GDP.

First, we examine spending on labor markets. Included in this measure is spending on "passive" income maintenance programs such as unemployment and early retirement that draw

⁷ The list identifies parties that are populist, far right, far left, and/or Euroskeptic, and which received at least 2% of the vote in at least one national parliamentary election since 1998. The list has been peer reviewed by more than 30 academics specializing in European parties. For more information see <https://popu-list.org>.

⁸ For more information about the OECD's data and methodology see <http://www.oecd.org/social/expenditure.htm>.

strong support from populist voters. Spending on re-training and work subsidies that are designed to “activate” workers also fall into this category. In the time period examined, expenditures on these programs ranged from 0.3% to 6.5% of GDP, with the bulk of spending going to unemployment and early retirement.

Second, we examine expenditures on social services that do not involve cash transfers. In most countries this would include spending on care and accommodation for the elderly, health, childcare, housing assistances, and incapacity services. Spending on social services ranges from 3.4% to 13.9% of GDP.

Finally, we consider total social spending. This last category is the most comprehensive measure of welfare state spending covering all social insurance and social assistance payments, and subsuming our first and second measures. In the period examined, total social spending was as high as 32.9% and as low as 13.1% of GDP.

III. Empirical Analysis

We conduct a two-part empirical strategy to explore whether and how welfare policies mediate the appeal of populist parties.⁹ In Part A, we examine election results from a panel of 17 countries during the period 1990-2017. In Part B, we examine the thesis further using eight waves of the European Social Survey. In both analyses, we are interested primarily in two analytical questions: (1) Is populist voting less likely in countries with comparatively high levels of compensatory spending? (2) Do decreases (or increases) in social spending affect support for

⁹ In most European countries, the major social policy frameworks are determined at the national level, limiting the opportunities to exploit sub-national variation to examine our central questions of interest. Moreover, comparable data on social policy expenditures is more readily available at the national than the regional level. Consequently, our main empirical focus is to examine cross-national variation.

populist parties? If the welfare state limits the appeal of populist parties, then we would expect these parties to see lower *levels* of support within countries that spend more on compensation, all other things equal. If *reductions* in social spending affects electoral support, then we would expect populist parties to be more successful within countries that have pursued more substantial cuts from earlier levels.

A: Welfare Spending and Populist Vote Shares, 1990-2017

As an initial exploration of this question, we run ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions using an unbalanced panel of 187 parliamentary elections held in 17 western European countries from 1990-2017.¹⁰ 115 of these are elections for national parliament and 72 for the European Parliament. In all models, the dependent variable is the proportion of votes received by populist parties in each election.¹¹ Results of presidential, local, and regional elections are excluded, as are elections to upper chambers. Since majoritarian electoral systems alter the strategies of voters, results from elections using plurality voting rules, such as elections to the UK parliament, are also excluded from the analysis.¹² Because immigration is both a palpable manifestation of globalization, and a common target of right-wing populist parties, we control for immigration

¹⁰ The countries examined are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK. We do not include the formerly communist countries of Eastern Europe because of differences in the structure of the welfare state and the character of populist parties in these countries. We exclude Iceland, Liechtenstein, Cyprus, or Malta because of data limitations.

¹¹ National election results for parties identified by the PopuList are taken from the Timbro Authoritarian Populism Index (<https://populismindex.com>), and confirmed with the European Election Database (https://nsd.no/european_election_database/about/). For national-level results from European Parliamentary elections we code the totals using the European Union's reported election results, using national parties as a guide where possible. : < <https://election-results.eu/>>.

¹² Results from two-round majoritarian systems, such as the electoral system found in France, are included because voters do not face the same strategic incentives to vote for a majority party in the first round. Results from the UK's elections to the European Parliament are examined since these use proportional representation electoral rules.

rates.¹³ Given the high degree to which refugees have been politicized in recent years, we also assess whether the flow of asylum seekers is correlated with populist voting.

In light of the fact that deindustrialization is often seen as contributing to the growth of populism (e.g. Swank and Betz 2003), we also include two measures of manufacturing employment: the share of the labor force employed in industry, provided by the International Labour Organization; and the rate of deindustrialization within each country, measured as the percentage change since the mid-1990's.¹⁴ Since the political effects of deindustrialization may depend on how much compensation is provided to affected workers, we also include an interaction term for deindustrialization and social spending that corresponds with the social spending measure being examined.

Scholars of populism have long noted the link between the slowdown of economic growth since the 1980's and the rise of populist parties (e.g. Anderson 1996). Consequently, a country's annual unemployment and per capita income (in purchasing power parity) are included as controls. Because populist parties often position themselves as the solution to endemic institutional corruption, we also add a measure of national-level institutional quality, which is produced annually by Transparency International.¹⁵ We control for whether the election was held for the national or European Parliament, and cluster by country years. Table 1 provides summary statistics on the variables used in the panel analysis.

¹³ For this and other baseline figures, the specific year will vary depending on a country's election year and data availability. However, all of them fall between 1993-1996.

¹⁴ The industry sector consists of mining, manufacturing, construction, and public utilities (electricity, gas, and water).

¹⁵ Specifically, we use Transparency International's "Corruption Perceptions Index." See <<https://www.transparency.org/cpi2018>>.

To measure change over time, we also examine all three spending measures using country and year fixed effects. By assuming country and time effects to be constant, this allows us to examine whether a change in social expenditures within a country, and in relation to the cross-panel annual average, is associated with a higher or lower populist vote share.

<Tables 1 and 2 about here>.

Table 2 reports the main results. Across most of the models, deindustrialization is associated with higher levels of populist voting. Where the rate of deindustrialization is higher, and where it has increased more from earlier baselines, we observe higher vote shares for populist parties.¹⁶ This is more or less in line with expectations that deindustrialization has contributed to the rising popularity of populist parties, especially in western European countries (e.g. Kriesi et al. 2006). The relationship between income and populism is also in line with previous research. An increase in per capita income is associated with lower populist vote shares (Models 2a, 4a, 6a), reflecting the fact that support for populist parties is partly a function of the health of the economy. Finally, in countries where institutional quality is perceived more favorably, populist parties have lower vote shares (Models 3a and 5a).

The results for immigration are perhaps more surprising. In most of the models, neither overall levels of immigration nor increases in immigration are associated with populist vote share. In one model, higher immigration rates predict less support for populist parties. Since a number of scholars have found strong associations between increased immigration rates and

¹⁶ In results not reported here, we find that the relationship between the deindustrialization and increased support for populism is even stronger within the EU-15.

support for populist parties at the regional level (e.g. Patana 2018; Cavaille and Ferwerda 2018), we believe these results reflect the limitations of using national-level indicators.

Most importantly for our purposes, there does appear to be a relationship between welfare spending and populist vote share. As can be seen in Model 1a, countries that spend greater shares of their budgets on labor markets – controlling for unemployment – appear to have lower overall levels of support for populist parties. And as can be seen in the fixed effects models, within-country increases in spending on labor markets (Model 2a) and social services (Model 4a) are associated with lower populist vote shares. Additionally, the interaction term between labor market spending and deindustrialization is negative, suggesting that the effect of spending on populist support becomes stronger in the face of deindustrialization. And while overall social spending totals are not associated with populist vote shares (Models 5a and 6a), increases in social spending does appear to dampen support for populist parties in the face of increases in immigration (Model 6a). At the very least, these results suggest that the significant cuts to labor market support and social services seen in recent decades may have increased the appeal of populist alternatives. The results also provide some reason to think that welfare spending may mitigate the success of populist parties within countries that are experiencing manufacturing job losses and rapid increases in immigration.

B. Welfare Spending and Populist Voters: A Multi-Level Analysis

While the panel analysis provides evidence that lower overall levels of compensation and decreases in spending over time are associated with higher populist vote shares, it does not allow us to control for individual-level characteristics that might affect support for populist parties. By constructing multi-level models that combine country-level statistics with individual-level survey data, we can more precisely identify which parts of the population are voting for populist parties

and determine whether and how these groups' political preferences are affected by the level and type of spending on labor markets and other welfare measures. This, in turn, allows us to make a more precise prediction of the effect of compensation, and austerity, on the likelihood that an individual will support a populist party.

We use OLS regressions to analyze eight waves of the European Social Survey, a semi-annual survey of public attitudes in 32 countries, conducted by the European Research Infrastructure Consortium. All western European countries are analyzed except for Iceland, Malta, Cyprus, and Liechtenstein. Since we are only examining national parliamentary elections, we exclude the United Kingdom, given its first-past-the-post electoral system.¹⁷ This leaves a total of 16 countries: 11 with complete results, one with nearly complete results (7 of 8), and four others participating in 2-6 waves.¹⁸

Our dependent variable is a binary indicator of whether a respondent reported voting for a populist party of the right or left in the previous election.¹⁹ Since our main theoretical interest is whether compensatory social spending conditions support for populist parties, we exclude those individuals who indicated they were ineligible to vote, did not vote, or otherwise did not respond to the question. As before, we use the *PopuList* to code populist parties, and the OECD's Social Expenditure Database to compare social spending, focusing on both the effect of overall spending levels, as well as changes in spending over time. Since the question asks respondents

¹⁷ We include results for the French national parliament, which also uses a plurality voting system, because the two-round election encourages voters to support their first-choice preference during the first round, much as in PR systems.

¹⁸ The countries examined are Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and Sweden. For the full list of participating countries by survey round, see < <https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/downloadwizard/> >.

¹⁹ The coding is based on respondents' answers to the question "Which party did you vote for in [the last national parliamentary] election?"

who they supported in the previous election, responses are coded for the relevant election year. This method allows us to estimate support for populist parties during the period 1999-2015 in a way that complements the earlier analysis.

Because we are now analyzing individuals, we add a number of demographic controls, including gender, age, and whether a respondent is a member of a racial or ethnic minority. We also control for educational and occupational characteristics. To categorize educational attainment, we rely on an ESS question about schooling that has been harmonized into the International Standard of Classification (ISCED) developed by the United National Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). The ISCED classification divides educational attainment into seven tiers ranging from “less than lower secondary” to “higher tertiary education.” We exclude the largest category of education—those with lower secondary attainment (ISCED II).

To categorize occupation, we use a question from the ESS that asks respondents to state their current or former occupation, which is subsequently classified into the ten-tiered International Standard Classification of Occupation (ISCO) developed by the International Labour Organization. In all of our models, we exclude the mid-skill category of clerk. The 30,000 respondents who did not provide educational or occupational information are excluded from the analysis, bringing the total number of respondents to 105,042. Tables 3 and 4 summarize these educational and occupational divisions, and the proportion of voters within each division supporting populist parties.

<Tables 3 and 4 about here>.

To account for the effects of the short-term economic cycle, and a country's level of economic development, we include three macro-economic indicators used previously: the unemployment rate, the industrial employment rate, and per capita income. As before, we also assess whether immigration rates and perceived institutional quality condition outcomes. All of the models are weighted by country population.²⁰

Table 5 reports the regression results. As expected, many of the controls are significant throughout the models. In line with previous scholarship, men are more likely to vote for populist parties, and racial/ethnic minorities less so. Educational attainment also correlates with populist voting—with those in the bottom tier and top few tiers less likely to support populist parties than those with secondary education. Current or former members of trade unions are also more likely to support populist parties—reflecting the fact that populist voters come disproportionately from the more heavily unionized secondary sector of the economy. Compared to the reference category of clerks, craftworkers, service and sales workers, and machinists are also more likely to support populist parties.²¹

<Table 5 about here>.

Several of our macro-level controls are also significant. Living in a country and year where institutions are perceived as less corrupt is associated with a lower likelihood of supporting a populist party while decreases in employment for manufacturing is associated with a higher likelihood. As before, higher immigration rates are associated with a lower rather than

²⁰ For more on ESS weighting see https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/docs/methodology/ESS_weighting_data_1.pdf.

²¹ However, the positive coefficient for machinists is not statistically significant at conventional levels when trade union membership is included in the model.

greater likelihood of supporting a populist party. However, when we add fixed effects, immigration is no longer statistically significant at conventional measures.

Across two of the three standard models (3b and 5b), higher social expenditures predict a lower likelihood of supporting a populist party. Those countries that spend more on compensation – whether in the form of in-kind spending on social services or total social spending – have lower likelihoods of supporting populist parties. The evidence that *reductions* in welfare spending increases support for populist parties is even stronger. In the fixed effects models, within-country increases in spending are associated with lower likelihoods of supporting populist parties across all three measures of social expenditures. The effect of changes in spending is particularly strong for labor market expenditures.

Figures 2 and 3 summarize the likelihood of supporting a populist party at different levels of labor market and social services spending. The fixed effects models suggest that changes in spending have a substantively significant effect on support for populist parties. As seen in Figure 2, which shows the marginal likelihood of supporting a populist party under different levels of social services spending (Model 4b), a decrease of just one percentage point of spending on social services is associated with a 25% increased likelihood that a voter will support a populist party.²² The apparent effect of labor market spending is even stronger. As indicated in Figure 3, summarizing the marginal effect of labor market spending on populist voting (Model 2b), a one percentage point increase in labor market spending from the mean of 2.25% of GDP is associated with a 50% decrease in a voter's likelihood of supporting a populist party: dropping from 0.10 to

²² The predicted probability of supporting a populist party is 0.103 when social services spending is at the mean of 8.6% of GDP; the probability increases to 0.129 when social services spending drops one percentage point to 7.6% of GDP.

0.05. In many countries, such a shift would largely erase the electoral gains achieved by populist parties in recent years.²³

< Figures 2 and 3 about here >

IV. Discussion and Conclusion

The above analysis provides new insight into the relationship between compensatory welfare spending and support for populist parties. Across multiple model parameters, and two independently generated data sets, we have found consistent associations between public spending on compensation and populist voting across 17 western European countries over a 27-year time period. Generally speaking, where higher proportions of societal resources are provided for social services and cash transfers, populist parties receive smaller shares of the vote in national and European elections, and the average voter is less likely to support populist parties.

Additionally, we have found evidence that reductions in spending on income maintenance since the 1990's, and austerity measures pursued following the crisis, may have contributed to the rising electoral fortunes of populist parties on the right and left. In the panel analysis conducted in Part IIA, we found that within-country decreases in labor market spending are associated with higher populist vote shares. In the multi-level analyses conducted in Part IIB, we found similarly that cuts to labor market support and spending on social services predicts a higher likelihood that voters will support a populist party.

²³ To give just one example: the German rightwing populist party, AfD, received 12.6% of the vote in the 2017 election for the Bundestag, more than twice the proportion received in 2013 (4.7%).

These observed relationships are robust to a number of different model specifications: when limiting our analysis to elections that occurred since 2000; when excluding elections for the European Parliament; and when controlling for the flow of asylum seekers and the size of the foreign-born population (as opposed to the rate of immigration). The effect also remains when accounting for the fact that labor market expenditures are counter-cyclical.²⁴ Finally, the results remain when using Eurostat data, which includes a slightly different set of countries, and when using different lists of populist or radical parties.

Do our findings suggest that cuts to compensation, whether as a result of labor market reform or austerity, have contributed to the electoral success of populist parties? Since these results are observational, we should be cautious about causal interpretations. The consistent negative correlations between national expenditures on welfare and populist vote share could relate to factors omitted from this analysis, while the association between labor market reform and increased austerity on the one hand, and the rising fortunes of populist parties on the other hand, may reflect parallel historical trends which are not causally related.

These caveats notwithstanding, the most consistent and robust finding from our analysis is that populist parties are weaker in countries that spend more on compensation, and that have cut welfare spending less substantially from historical levels. Across multiple models and measures of spending, we have found that cuts to welfare spending, as a result of reform and austerity, are strongly associated with rising support for populist parties. And we have shown that compensatory spending may be particularly effective at moderating support for populism when countries are experiencing rapid deindustrialization and increases in immigration. Furthermore,

²⁴ A revised measure that calculates labor market expenditures as a percent of GDP per point of unemployment also predicts lower populist vote shares.

we have identified plausible mechanisms by which compensation may affect political preferences: dampening the effects of globalization and technological change on livelihoods, and thereby reducing the grievances among the groups most affected.

Conclusion

The evidence presented in the paper suggests that compensation moderates support for populist parties opposed to core dimensions of globalization and European integration. As expected by the compensation hypothesis, higher levels of social spending moderate support for populism among those who have seen their relative economic and social status decline. Also as expected, cuts in social spending stimulate support for populism. Where countries have pursued less extensive austerity measures, and maintained higher levels of compensatory policies, we observe less robust populist movements. Policymakers and the public might contemplate the fact that appropriate social policies can limit a backlash to globalization and automation, while substantial austerity measures could stimulate such a backlash. If the rise of populist parties is, indeed, a political concern, and social compensation could partially mitigate it, it may well be worth adopting social and labor-market policies that foster greater long-term political stability. The policy implications are clear – even if the political path to implementing appropriate policies is not.

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Appendix 1: Figures

Figure 1: Labor Market Spending Per Percentage Point of Unemployment in Select Western European Countries






Figure 2: Predicted Probabilities of Populist Support at Different Levels of Social Services Spending (Model 4b)



Source: Author's calculations. Data from European Social Survey; OECD.

Figure 3: Predicted Probabilities of Populist Support at Different Levels of Labor Market Spending (Model 2b)



Source: Author's calculations. Data from European Social Survey; OECD.

Appendix 2: Tables

Table 1: Panel Summary Statistics

	mean	median	count
Populist Vote Share	9.9	7.4	187
Labor Market Spending (% of GDP)	2.3	2.2	187
Social Services Spending (% of GDP)	8.1	7.8	187
Total Social Spending (% of GDP)	23.2	24.0	187
Unemployment Rate	8.4	7.7	187
Election Type (1=National; 2=European)	1.4	1	187
Per capita income (PPP, €'000s)	30.2	27.1	187
Immigration Rate (% of population)	0.79	0.6	187
Percentage Employed in Industry	25.1	25.4	187
Deindustrialization (Decrease in Industry Employment since Mid-1990's)	9.4	7.5	187
Deindustrialization*Labor Market Spending	22.1	12.6	187
Deindustrialization*Social Services Spending	87.1	53.7	187
Deindustrialization*Total Social Spending	239.3	163.5	187
Immigration*Labor Market Spending	1.6	1.6	187
Immigration*Social Services Spending	6.3	4.7	187
Immigration*Total Social Spending	17.9	14.3	187

Table 2, Determinants of Populist Vote Share, Panel Analysis

	Labor Market Spending (1a)	Labor Market Spending (FE) (2a)	Social Services Spending (3a)	Social Services Spending (FE) (4a)	Total Social Spending (5a)	Total Social Spending (FE) (6a)
Compensation (Social Spending as % GDP)	-2.424** (0.009)	-4.110** (0.001)	0.607 (0.234)	-1.764* (0.030)	0.428 (0.077)	-0.155 (0.654)
Unemployment Rate	-0.213 (0.354)	0.487 (0.097)	-0.422* (0.036)	-0.0385 (0.898)	-0.489* (0.024)	0.257 (0.382)
Level of Election	-1.587 (0.180)	-0.346 (0.789)	-1.249 (0.286)	-0.313 (0.799)	-1.642 (0.178)	-0.544 (0.670)
Per Capita Income (PPP, €'000's)	0.0179 (0.075)	-0.0406** (0.001)	0.0244** (0.003)	-0.0419*** (0.001)	0.0165 (0.071)	-0.0396** (0.002)
Corruption Perceptions Index (TI)	-0.182 (0.749)	-2.279 (0.063)	-0.899* (0.029)	-2.524* (0.022)	-1.274*** (0.001)	-1.889 (0.084)
Immigration Rate	-7.260** (0.010)	-8.570 (0.079)	7.521 (0.074)	-6.463 (0.268)	13.00 (0.065)	12.41 (0.110)
Immigration * Compensation	1.921 (0.176)	2.165 (0.283)	-0.0380 (0.150)	-0.0282 (0.204)	-0.755* (0.022)	-0.826* (0.024)
% Employed in Industry	-0.347 (0.091)	3.706* (0.017)	-0.187 (0.345)	4.792*** (0.001)	-0.298 (0.142)	6.030*** (0.000)
Deindustrialization (% Change since 1995)	0.418* (0.027)	1.206*** (0.001)	0.647** (0.004)	1.468*** (0.000)	0.00817 (0.978)	1.604*** (0.000)
Deindustrialization * Compensation	-0.105 (0.167)	-0.143* (0.030)	-1.657** (0.004)	0.341 (0.605)	0.0123 (0.337)	0.00150 (0.920)
Constant	25.22*** (0.001)	-66.55 (0.193)	15.99* (0.041)	-95.17* (0.045)	18.53* (0.040)	-144.1** (0.002)
Country and Year Fixed Effects	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	187	187	187	187	187	187
Adjusted R ²	0.266	0.653	0.322	0.643	0.256	0.642

p-values in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 3: Populist Vote Share by Educational Group

	Populist vote share	Proportion of total voters
ES-ISCED I , less than lower secondary	0.06	0.17
ES-ISCED II, lower secondary (<i>reference group</i>)	0.09	0.24
ES-ISCED IIIb, lower tier upper secondary	0.09	0.19
ES-ISCED IIIa, upper tier upper secondary	0.12	0.17
ES-ISCED IV, advanced vocational, sub-degree	0.07	0.09
ES-ISCED V1, lower tertiary education, BA level	0.06	0.07
ES-ISCED V2, higher tertiary education, >= MA level	0.06	0.08

Source: European Social Survey, Waves 1-8. Proportions weighted by country population. Rounding may lead to totals greater than 1.

Table 4: Populist Party Support by Occupational Group

	Populist vote share	Proportion of total voters
Elementary occupations	0.076	0.13
Plant and machine operators, and assemblers	0.095	0.08
Craft and related trades workers	0.10	0.14
Skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery workers	0.067	0.04
Service and sales workers	0.091	0.20
Clerical support workers (<i>reference group</i>)	0.076	0.10
Technicians and associate professionals	0.073	0.14
Professionals	0.067	0.11
Managers	0.067	0.06
Armed forces occupations	0.069	0.003

Source: European Social Survey, Waves 1-8. Proportions weighted by country population. Rounding may lead to totals greater than 1.

Table 5, Likelihood of Populist Vote, Models 1-6b

	Labor Market Spending (1b)	Labor Market Spending (FE) (2b)	Social Services Spending (3b)	Social Services Spending (FE) (4b)	Total Social Spending (5b)	Total Social Spending (FE) (6b)
Compensation (Social Spending as % of GDP)	-0.00818 (0.587)	-0.0522*** (0.000)	-0.0134** (0.002)	-0.0223* (0.025)	-0.00490* (0.038)	-0.0159* (0.024)
Unemployment Rate	-0.00688 (0.065)	-0.000183 (0.968)	-0.00649 (0.074)	-0.0116** (0.001)	-0.00647 (0.095)	-0.00320 (0.523)
Per Capita Income (PPS, €'000's)	0.00740* (0.025)	-0.00672 (0.084)	0.00927** (0.004)	-0.00699 (0.119)	0.00872* (0.011)	-0.0123* (0.030)
Immigration Rate	-0.0256 (0.284)	0.0509 (0.101)	-0.0537* (0.037)	0.0553 (0.108)	-0.0510* (0.039)	0.0569 (0.100)
Corruption Perceptions Index (TI)	-0.0541* (0.021)	-0.0118 (0.402)	-0.0527* (0.023)	-0.00327 (0.845)	-0.0604* (0.016)	0.00247 (0.888)
% Employed in Manufacturing	-0.00377 (0.187)	-0.0120 (0.065)	-0.00237 (0.391)	-0.0249*** (0.000)	-0.00268 (0.370)	-0.0155* (0.033)
Male	0.0202*** (0.000)	0.0187*** (0.000)	0.0193*** (0.000)	0.0186*** (0.000)	0.0196*** (0.000)	0.0186*** (0.000)
Age (Years)	-0.000285 (0.212)	-0.000383 (0.101)	-0.000260 (0.220)	-0.000386 (0.100)	-0.000251 (0.244)	-0.000385 (0.100)
Racial/Ethnic Minority	-0.0282*** (0.000)	-0.0269*** (0.000)	-0.0278*** (0.000)	-0.0268*** (0.000)	-0.0279*** (0.000)	-0.0269*** (0.000)
EISCED 1	-0.0312* (0.019)	-0.00293 (0.672)	-0.0278* (0.030)	-0.00263 (0.702)	-0.0289* (0.026)	-0.00256 (0.710)
EISCED 3	-0.00438 (0.638)	0.00276 (0.624)	-0.000876 (0.926)	0.00276 (0.624)	-0.00166 (0.857)	0.00280 (0.618)
EISECD 4	-0.00356 (0.762)	-0.0133 (0.092)	0.000951 (0.927)	-0.0133 (0.091)	0.000666 (0.950)	-0.0133 (0.092)
EISCED 5	-0.0277* (0.044)	-0.0114 (0.234)	-0.0191 (0.105)	-0.0114 (0.236)	-0.0222 (0.063)	-0.0114 (0.236)
EISECD 6	-0.0356* (0.022)	-0.0210 (0.086)	-0.0323* (0.028)	-0.0210 (0.085)	-0.0338* (0.023)	-0.0209 (0.086)
EISCED 7	-0.0349* (0.039)	-0.0230 (0.121)	-0.0309* (0.050)	-0.0233 (0.116)	-0.0319* (0.042)	-0.0231 (0.118)
Elementary Occupation	0.00538 (0.368)	0.00674 (0.190)	0.00827 (0.164)	0.00686 (0.183)	0.00713 (0.229)	0.00687 (0.182)
Machinist	0.0143 (0.110)	0.0170 (0.060)	0.0168 (0.067)	0.0171 (0.058)	0.0159 (0.077)	0.0171 (0.059)
Craft Worker	0.0172* (0.039)	0.0136 (0.108)	0.0176* (0.031)	0.0138 (0.101)	0.0174* (0.033)	0.0138 (0.102)
Skilled Agriculturalist	-0.00109 (0.903)	-0.00795 (0.284)	-0.00192 (0.833)	-0.00747 (0.310)	-0.00102 (0.913)	-0.00765 (0.300)
Service Worker	0.0145** (0.010)	0.0135** (0.007)	0.0170** (0.005)	0.0137** (0.006)	0.0156** (0.008)	0.0137** (0.006)

Technician	-0.00541 (0.187)	-0.00999* (0.038)	-0.00501 (0.205)	-0.00972* (0.042)	-0.00490 (0.213)	-0.00981* (0.041)
Professional	-0.00513 (0.473)	-0.0137 (0.090)	-0.00533 (0.450)	-0.0132 (0.098)	-0.00483 (0.502)	-0.0134 (0.095)
Manager	-0.0148 (0.073)	-0.0138 (0.086)	-0.0165 (0.050)	-0.0135 (0.089)	-0.0157 (0.066)	-0.0137 (0.087)
Army	-0.0314 (0.078)	-0.0291 (0.084)	-0.0282 (0.112)	-0.0285 (0.091)	-0.0293 (0.097)	-0.0285 (0.090)
Trade Union Member	0.0278*** (0.001)	0.0251** (0.006)	0.0337*** (0.000)	0.0252** (0.005)	0.0306*** (0.000)	0.0252** (0.006)
Constant	0.489* (0.049)	0.824*** (0.000)	0.504* (0.022)	1.219*** (0.000)	0.579* (0.022)	1.221*** (0.000)
Country and Year Fixed Effects	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	105,042	105,042	105,042	105,042	105,042	105,042
Adjusted R^2	0.050	0.101	0.056	0.101	0.052	0.101

p-values in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Appendix 3: Categorization of Parties

Country	Party Abbreviation	Full Party Name	Populist Party?	Radical Party?
Austria	FPÖ	<i>Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs</i>	Yes	Right
	BZÖ	<i>Bündnis Zukunft Österreich</i>	Yes	Right
	Martin	<i>Hans Peter Martin's List</i>	Yes	No
	TS	<i>Team Stronach</i>	Yes	No
Belgium	VB	<i>Vlaams Belang</i>	Yes	Right
	PVDA/PTB	<i>Partij van de Arbeid van België</i>	No	Left
	FN	<i>Front National</i>	Yes	Right
	LDD		Yes	No
Denmark	En-O	<i>Red-Green Alliance (Enhedslisten)</i>	No	Left
	DF	<i>Danish People's Party (Dansk Folkeparti)</i>	Yes	Right
	FRP	<i>Progress Party (Fremskridtspartiet)</i>	Yes	Right
	SF	<i>Socialist People's Party</i>	No	Left
Finland	PS	<i>Finns Party (Sannfinländarna)</i>	Yes	Right
	VAS	<i>Left Alliance</i>	No	Left
	SIN	<i>Blue Reform</i>	Yes	No
France	FN	<i>Front National</i>	Yes	Right
	FI	<i>Le France Insoumise</i>	No	Left
	PCF/FdG	<i>Parti Communiste Français/ Front de Gauche</i>	Yes	Left
Germany	PDS/Linke	<i>Die Linke</i>	Yes	Left
	AfD	<i>Alternative für Deutschland</i>	Yes	Right
Greece	Syriza	<i>Syriza – Coalition of the Radical Left</i>	Yes	Left
	ANEL	<i>Independent Greeks</i>	Yes	No
	Golden Dawn	<i>Golden Dawn</i>		Right
	KKE	<i>Communist Party of Greece</i>		Left
	LAOS	<i>Popular Orthodox Rally</i>	Yes	Right
	SYN	<i>Synaspismos – The Coalition of the Left</i>		Left
DIKKI	<i>Democratic Social Movement</i>	Yes	Left	
Ireland	SF	<i>Sinn Féin</i>	Yes	Left
	SP	<i>Socialist Party</i>	No	Left
Italy	PdL	<i>The People of Freedom/ Forza Italia (FI)</i>	Yes	No
	LN	<i>Lega (Lega Nord)</i>	Yes	Right
	M5S	<i>Movimento Cinque Stelle</i>	Yes	No
	SEL	<i>Left Ecology Freedom</i>	No	Left
	FDI	<i>Fratelli d'Italia - Alleanza Nazionale</i>	Yes	Right
	RC	<i>Civil Revolution</i>	No	Left
	PdCI	<i>Party of the Italian Communists</i>	No	Left
	MSFT	<i>Tricolor Flame Social Movement</i>	No	Right
	PRC	<i>Communist Refoundation Party</i>	No	Left

Luxembourg	ADR Dei Lenk	Alternative Democratic Reform Party The Left	Yes No	No Left
Netherlands	PVV SP LPF 50PLUS	<i>Partij voor de Vrijheid</i> <i>Socialistische Partij</i> <i>Lijst Pim Fortuyn</i> 50PLUS	Yes Yes Yes No	Right Left Right No
Norway	FrP SV Rødt KrF	Progress Party (<i>Fremskrittspartiet</i>) Socialist Left Party <i>Rødt</i> <i>Christian Democratic Party</i>	Yes No No No	Right Left Left No
Portugal	BE CDU(PEV & PCP)	<i>Bloco de Esquerda</i> Unitary Democratic Coalition	No No	Left Left
Spain	IU Podemos	<i>Izquierda Unida</i> <i>Podemos</i>	No Yes	Left Left
Sweden	V (VPK) SD	<i>Vänsterpartiet (previously Vänsterpartiet Kommunisterna)</i> <i>Sverigedemokraterna</i>	No Yes	Left Right
Switzerland	SVP	<i>Schweizerische Volkspartei</i>	Yes	Right
United Kingdom	UKIP	<i>United Kingdom Independence Party</i>	Yes	Right

Source: Rooduijn et al. 2019. Available at < <https://popu-list.org>.