Compensation, Austerity and Populism:

Labor Market Spending and Voting in 16 Western European Countries

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Abstract

There has been a dramatic rise in voting for populist parties in Europe over the past thirty years. We assess the role of government labor market policy in dampening or provoking populist sentiment. Drawing from a panel of 134 elections from 1990 to 2021 and pooled cross-sectional data from eleven waves of the European Social Survey, we find evidence that populist parties fared worse where countries provided more robust income support to workers experiencing unemployment. The effect was stronger among those individuals who had experienced unemployment and among current and former trade union members. This suggests that the welfare cuts and labor-market reforms pursued since the early 2000's may have alienated vulnerable segments of the population and driven them toward populist parties.

The past twenty-five years have seen a striking increase in support for European populist parties. In 1998, populist parties drew support from less than 10% of European citizens. Only two capitals on the continent—Bratislava and Bern—had populist politicians serving in government. In 2024, populist parties held 27% of national parliamentary seats in Europe and served in eight different governments; they were part of a confidence-and-supply agreement in one other (Heinö, 2024).

There are major differences among European populist movements, of the Right and the Left. All of them, however, share an antagonism to existing mainstream political parties and political institutions. And all of them, in different ways, are skeptical of or hostile to central aspects of European integration. Some, especially on the Left, oppose austerity measures and fiscal constraints they see as imposed by European institutions. Others, especially on the Right, resent European policies toward refugees, asylum-seekers, and immigration generally. Still others are more broadly concerned that the European Union and the international trading system have eroded too much of their nations' sovereignty or accelerated processes of deindustrialization that have devastated many communities.

Many of the material sources of the upsurge in populist sentiment in Europe – and elsewhere – have been well established. There is ample evidence for the impact of economic distress, both due to international economic trends and to automation (Anelli, Colantone, & Stanig, 2019; Colantone & Stanig, 2018; Rodrik, 2018). Certainly, there are important cultural, ethnic, and traditionalist bases of populist sentiment and rhetoric (Norris & Inglehart, 2019), and there is clear evidence of both material and non-material sources of populism (Frieden, 2022). Our focus is on a different economically based source of populist sentiment: national government welfare policies. We argue that social policies—in particular, both the level and rates of change in spending

on programs that maintain incomes for working-age adults who are fully or partially unemployed—have had an impact on the appeal of populism.

In this paper, then, we follow up on findings that economic distress tends to stimulate populism. We ask two related questions. First, does the existence of an ample unemployment insurance system that softens the impact of negative economic trends reduce political discontent? In particular, does higher levels of spending on labor markets and higher unemployment insurance replacement rates (UI RR) reduce the discontent that leads to populist voting? Second, do cuts to unemployment support stimulate this discontent? In particular, have reductions in UI generosity as a result of labor market reform or austerity increased the likelihood that affected parts of the population will support populist parties?

We argue for two distinct channels by which government social policies, in particular labor market programs, have affected the strength and nature of populist sentiment. The first channel operates over the long-term: countries that evolved a broader and deeper social safety net for working adults facing actual or potential economic disruption have experienced less of a populist backlash than those who have not. This suggests that some form of the "compensation hypothesis" – that compensating those harmed by economic changes, or most vulnerable to harm, can mitigate the socio-political impact of those changes – may be correct.

On this dimension, we find evidence that higher expenditures on labor market programs, predict lower populist vote shares, controlling for other factors. From a panel analysis of 134 national legislative election results, we show that where governments provide more generous support to the unemployed, and more funding to help individuals return to work, populist parties are less successful electorally. This relationship is most robust for populist parties but also observed when we separately examine extreme rightwing and extreme leftwing parties,

respectively. Our analysis of pooled survey data from the European Social Survey also indicates that more generous unemployment protection may moderate support for populist parties. We find that higher levels of social expenditures on labor markets, and more generous UI replacement rates, predict a lower likelihood that a respondent will have supported a populist party in the previous election.

The second channel connecting government policy to populism is more recent: countries whose governments have significantly reduced spending for out-of-work individuals – whether due to labor market reform or austerity measures – have experienced a greater backlash against political and economic integration. Both the labor market reforms pursued in many northern European countries in the 2000's, and the austerity measures imposed on southern European countries in the 2010's have reduced the generosity of unemployment insurance that replaces the income of workers facing short and long-term employment disruption. These reforms may have had a particularly negative impact on precisely those segments of the population that were already experiencing significant economic insecurity related to globalization, deindustrialization, and technological change (Autor, Levy, & Murnane, 2003).

We find that cuts to unemployment benefits are associated with greater support for populist parties in general and rightwing parties in particular. All other things equal, a 5-percentage-point increase in the unemployment insurance replacement rate reduces the predicted probability of an individual voting for a populist party from 7.7% to 4.2%, and for left-wing parties from 4.1% to 3.3%. This effect is more pronounced for individuals who have experienced three or more months of unemployment and among current and former labor union members.

Our theory is tested against a rival hypothesis suggesting that the effect of social protection on support for populist parties may depend on a country's level of immigration and individuals'

immigration preferences (Burgoon & Schakel, 2022; Vadlamannati, 2020). Consistent with prior research, we find that opposition to immigration increases support for populism and that general welfare state spending does not mitigate support for populism. However, our key finding—that higher labor market spending is associated with lower support for populist parties—is not influenced by immigration levels or individual attitudes toward immigration. Individuals with negative attitudes toward immigration are just as likely to reduce their support for populist parties when unemployment insurance is more generous. This finding aligns with evidence that well-designed and targeted welfare policies can dampen support for populist parties among those facing socioeconomic risk (Vlandas & Halikiopoulou, 2022).

The correlational nature of our analysis does not allow us to make strong causal claims about the relationship between unemployment insurance programs and support for populist parties. The relevant policies in this domain are set at the national level and are therefore endogenous to a wide variety of other socio-economic and political features of the nations in question. However, while establishing causal identification for such policies is challenging, it does not diminish their importance as subjects of empirical investigation. Our findings highlight a significant empirical relationship between unemployment insurance spending – both in their aggregate and in their change over time – and the attractions of populism to national populations. The results suggest that welfare expenditures at the national level plausibly shape public support for populist parties. These conclusions are robust to a range of alternative specifications and are consistent with recent studies that use granular data and spending discontinuities to demonstrate causal relationships between spending cuts and support for populist parties (Colantone & Stanig, 2018; Dickson, Hobolt, De Vries, & Cremaschi, 2024; Fetzer, 2019).

Populism can and does thrive in a variety of contexts and its development and durability is shaped by a wide array of factors (Gidron & Hall, 2020; Norris & Inglehart, 2019; Rodrik, 2018). Long-term economic, social, and cultural changes are undoubtedly the underlying forces behind growing support for populist parties. However, we contend that the structure and organization of the social safety net – and its trajectory of change – is one overlooked factor that likely mediates people's experience of these developments. By lessening the effects of economic and cultural change on livelihoods, compensation may reduce the extent of grievances and limit the appeal of populist political parties. And while labor-market and social-policy reforms may have been justified, their differential distributional impact may have had politically important and even explosive effects.

The paper is structured as follows. A first section provides a theoretical account of why levels of labor market spending might affect political support for populist parties. It also discusses the ways in which changes in labor-market policies can be expected to have a differential impact in different segments of the labor market. The second section provides an overview of the recent pattern of labor market and expenditures, addresses definitional issues with regards to populism, and describes the data we use. The third section evaluates the empirical relationship between labor market spending and populist voting using a panel of 134 election results and pooled cross-sectional survey data from eleven waves of the European Social Survey (ESS). A final section discusses some of the implications of these findings and concludes.

I. *Theory: Compensation and populism, austerity and populism*

The countries of Western Europe have undergone substantial socio-economic changes over the past fifty years, in particular the shrinkage of labor-intensive manufacturing. The decline of

low-skilled, high-paid jobs in industry has in turn been connected to the rise in populist sentiment; this can be seen especially with the geographical concentration of support for populism in declining industrial regions (Broz, Frieden, & Weymouth, 2021). These economic trends are largely the result of economic integration and technological progress, which suggests important theoretical questions of both a positive and normative nature. Because economic integration and technological progress, like most economic developments that create aggregate welfare gains, produce losers as well as winners, they can lead to political conflict. Indeed, in the political arena the distributional effects may outweigh the welfare effects, especially if the concerns of real or expected losers are more intense than those of winners, and if the losers are well-organized and well represented in the political system.

The political feasibility of welfare-improving policies with substantial distributional effects may, as a result, depend on using some of the welfare gains to compensate losers. One strand of the literature that addresses the issue focuses on what might make economic integration politically feasible in democratic political systems. Scholars have noted that more open economies tend to have larger governments, and have surmised that this is due to the greater need to compensate those threatened by the vagaries of the world economy (Cameron, 1978; Rodrik, 1998). In an influential series of country studies and a summary volume, Peter Katzenstein (1985) examined the small open economies of western Europe. He showed that they were largely forced by the fact that their small size made economic openness a necessity to devise comprehensive social safety nets to protect their citizens from the potential harms that openness might bring.

This "compensation hypothesis" should apply more broadly to any disruptive socio-economic developments. Here we use it to attempt to explain the impact of a social safety net on the political response to both specific trade shocks as well as the broader process of

deindustrialization and automation that has reduced the availability of high-paying manufacturing jobs and increased the insecurity and risk faced by routine workers (Kurer, 2020; Rehm, 2009).

The basic proposition is simple: policies that insure against income loss and protect workers and communities from instability can mitigate a potential political backlash against adverse trends. When economic changes are the cause of discontent, such policies can be seen as *compensating* the losers for their losses. Most directly, they replace income for the individuals who are experiencing economic dislocation and help them find alternative employment. More indirectly, they provide assurance to workers whose livelihoods are threatened by globalization and technological change. Labor market spending thus can reduce support for populist political parties that exploit economic (and cultural) grievances.

We do not suggest that countries with relatively generous welfare states will not still see an increase in support for populist parties generated by economic and cultural change. As noted earlier, populist politics stems from structural, long-term trends that affect nearly all advanced industrial democracies. However, we do suggest that countries with more extensive social support will see comparatively lower support for populist parties, all other things equal. Our proposition that labor market policy can affect the level of support for populist parties is in line with the broad policy feedback literature that has demonstrated how policies shape patterns of political participation (Campbell, 2011; Larsen, 2019). Despite the importance of the issue, there have been only a few attempts to evaluate whether this expectation has been borne out over the past twenty years. The careful empirical studies that have examined the question have produced small or inconsistent results (Gingrich, 2019; Halikiopoulou & Vlandas, 2016; Rickard, 2022).[1]

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[1] Rickard (2023) finds that increased compensation for globalization-induced job losses modestly decreased support for rightwing populism in France. Halikiopoulou and Vlandas (2016) and Vlandas and Halikiopoulou (2022) similarly find that unemployment benefits and labor market protections mute the effect of unemployment on far-

While the logic of compensation suggests that countries with well-developed social policies to assist citizens facing economic difficulties, an alternative view argues that the compensation dynamics observed for much of the second half of the 20th century may no longer apply to all European contexts (Burgoon & Schakel, 2022; Rathgeb & Busemeyer, 2022). In countries where immigration levels are high and social welfare is perceived as disproportionately benefiting immigrants, a large social welfare state may reinforce rather than mitigate the anti-globalization nationalism that fuels support for populist parties (Burgoon & Rooduijn, 2021; Burgoon & Schakel, 2022; Cavaille & Ferwerda, 2023; Vadlamannati, 2020). As discussed below, we have theoretical reasons to expect labor market spending will not be perceived as disproportionately benefiting immigrants. However, we still consider and test the possibility that citizen electoral responses to unemployment spending could be shaped by both immigration levels and immigration views.

Labor Market Spending and Cross-national Variation

To assess the relationship between compensation and support for populist parties, we examine spending on unemployment insurance and labor markets more broadly. We choose to focus on labor market spending rather than other kinds of social spending for several reasons. First and foremost, unemployment insurance programs provide the most direct and immediate form of assistance to those facing job and income loss generated by globalization and deindustrialization (Burgoon, 2001, p. 521). For this reason, labor market spending is often viewed as following a compensatory rather than a protective logic (Vlandas & Halikiopoulou, 2022). Social investments

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right support. However, in a cross-national study Gingrich (2019) concludes that compensatory approaches to workers facing automation have "weak or inconsistent" effects and may even strengthen support for the far right.

in education, childcare, and housing may be an important tool at the societal level to deal with the impact of economic change, but in many cases, they are not targeted at the individuals and households who have faced job loss. This sort of spending may in fact be irrelevant for middle-aged and older workers threatened by economic uncertainty.

Second, traditional contributory income maintenance programs such as unemployment insurance and pensions are consistently prioritized by the less educated and less skilled individuals and groups most adversely affected by economic integration and technological change and most likely to support populist parties (Garritzmann, Busemeyer, & Neimanns, 2018, p. 844). Survey research suggests that populist voters are the most likely group to support increased spending on traditional cash transfer programs such as unemployment insurance and the least likely to support new investments in education, childcare, and workfare programs (Garritzmann et al., 2018; Häusermann, 2018; Häusermann, Pinggera, Ares, & Enggist, 2020).

Figure 1 presents the average unemployment insurance replacement rates for two months and 24 months of unemployment across 16 Western European countries from 1990 to 2024. Replacement rates vary substantially across countries, ranging from as high as 90% in Luxembourg to below 50% in countries such as Ireland and Greece. This indicates that EU citizens experience markedly different levels of protection in the event of job loss. As the dislocating effects of economic globalization and deindustrialization have become more pronounced, these cross-national differences in the quality of the social safety net are likely to shape the political response to economic change.

Figure 1 also points to changes in the generosity of unemployment insurance programs over time. The average trend has been toward less generosity, particularly for the long-term unemployed. In 2001, a childless single adult living in the 16 countries analyzed in this study, and

Figure 1: Unemployment replacement rates in European countries, 1990-2024

earning the national average wage, would have received around 47% of their previous earnings after 24 months of unemployment. By 2013, the average replacement rate was nearly a fifth lower—just 39% under the same conditions. While replacement rates have gradually increased over the last decade in response to popular demands, they remained at an average of just 42% in 2024.

In many countries, unemployment insurance systems have also become more conditional, requiring workers to work for longer periods before being eligible, and to enroll in training or search for work as a condition for receiving benefits. These changes can be seen in overall labor market spending adjusted for the business cycle. Figure 2 details the trend in unemployment-adjusted labor market spending as a percentage of GDP across 16 western European countries. We can see once again significant differences in the level of spending across countries. Overall, countries in northern Europe spent twice as much on average than countries in southern Europe.

Figure 2: Unemployment-adjusted labor market spending in European countries, 1990-2022

Source: Calculations by authors. Data from European Social Survey; OECD.

We can also see significant within-country change over time. While changes were not uniform, the general trend has been toward lower levels of spending on labor markets. Between 1991 and 2015, adjusted-spending levels decreased 40%, driven by both labor market reforms that sought to reduce disincentives to work, and austerity measures enacted as part of the Euro-crisis.

Many northern European countries enacted the most substantively significant cutbacks, as part of labor market reforms designed to increase workforce participation (Bonoli, 2010; Hemerijck, 2015; Jenson, 2011). During the Euro-crisis, some countries were also subject to structural adjustment programs that reduced social welfare spending, including on unemployment insurance (Hermann, 2014). Following welfare state scholars who have shown how welfare cuts, even from high levels, leads voters to punish politicians who pursue retrenchment (Campbell,

2011; Kurer, Häusermann, Wüest, & Enggist, 2019; Pierson, 1996), we expect these cuts to provoke resentment that could increase the appeal of populist parties.

We thus have several theoretically grounded expectations which stem from or qualify the compensation hypothesis. Much like the original compensation hypothesis, we expect that countries that have evolved more substantial social safety nets for out-of-work adults will experience less of a populist upsurge, controlling for other factors. This is in essence about the impact of an established high safety-net political-economy equilibrium upon the rise of populist voting. However, we do not expect that all social welfare spending will dampen support for populism, given the diverse away constituencies that social spending benefits. Rather, we expect that labor market spending targeted at established, full-time workers will have the most impact.

Our second expectation about change over time provides a corollary to the compensation hypothesis. We expect that countries whose governments did, over the course of the past 30 years, undertake labor market reforms or austerity measures that limited cash transfers to those facing short- or long-term unemployment experienced a more significant increase in populist voting, while governments that maintained or expanded labor market programs experienced a less significant increase in populist voting. This expectation might explain why Scandinavian countries such as Sweden or Denmark that cut labor market expenditures could have experienced an increase in populist voting even as they maintained a comparatively generous welfare state.

Finally, as a check on our own assumptions, we consider the alternative hypothesis that welfare spending and populist voting may be positively correlated. The hard version of this argument is that more generous welfare states may be particularly prone to populist appeals given citizens' concerns that their established systems may be undermined by European integration, globalization, or increased immigration (Greve, 2019; Kitschelt & McGann, 1997). The softer

version of the argument is that the effect of compensation will depend on an individual's immigration views and the degree to which non-working immigrants are perceived as using the welfare state (Burgoon & Rooduijn, 2021; Burgoon & Schakel, 2022).

II. *Defining Populism and Measuring Social Expenditures*

The word populism has been used to describe a wide range of social movements and political programs, but the term is now widely associated with a variety of political parties outside of the political mainstream (Bonikowski & Gidron, 2016; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017). Substantial heterogeneity notwithstanding (Vasilopoulou, 2017), all populist parties share a number of common characteristics. Nearly all populist parties emphasize an antagonism between citizens and elites, pitting "the people" against the elites (Mansbridge & Macedo, 2019). In western Europe, populist parties of the Left and Right share two other common features. Nearly all are opposed to key aspects of European integration and employ elements of nationalism (Halikiopoulou, Nanou, & Vasilopoulou, 2012; Vasilopoulou, 2018), and nearly all draw disproportionate support from the traditional working class, which has seen its relative position decline as a result of European integration and technical change (Bornschier & Kriesi, 2012; Gidron & Hall, 2020; Oesch, 2008).

We recognize of course that there are important differences in both the ideologies and policy programs of left and rightwing populist parties as well as the educational levels of their social support base (Rooduijn, Burgoon, Van Elsas, & Van de Werfhorst, 2017; Visser, Lubbers, Kraaykamp, & Jaspers, 2014). These differences notwithstanding, left and right populist parties *both* use populist discourse to articulate the interests of a common category of citizens negatively affected by economic globalization, deindustrialization and technological change (Rooduijn & Akkerman, 2017). From this vantage, votes for leftwing and rightwing populist parties can equally

be viewed as expressions of discontent with processes of European economic and political integration that are widely viewed as benefiting elites at the expense of others (Kurer et al., 2019; Rodrik, 2018).

To categorize populist parties, we use the *PopuList*, an overview of populist parties developed by a consortium of political scientists (Rooduijn et al., 2023). This categorization overlaps with separately generated lists of far right and far left parties, with important differences. In this paper, we focus primarily on populist parties, while also reporting results for rightwing and leftwing parties. A full list of political parties classified as populist and/or radical is provided in the online appendix.

To measure welfare spending, we rely on several measures. First, we examine overall social spending as a percentage of GDP, using the OECD's Social Expenditures Database (OECD, 2025). This measure encompasses both cash payments to households as well as social services spending. This broad spending category has complex redistributive implications (or none) and may or may not be directly directed at those facing economic shocks or dislocation (Burgoon, 2001; Busemeyer & Garritzmann, 2019). It therefore provides an important baseline for examining the effect of labor market spending.

To capture spending on labor market we rely on a measure of overall labor market spending as a percentage of GDP. Two-thirds of this spending is for traditional unemployment insurance programs that provide those who lose their jobs with a certain percentage of their former salary. This is the spending that most directly and immediately aids workers facing economic shocks (Burgoon, 2001). Another third covers expenditures on counselling, subsidies to employers, job search assistance, and vocational training programs designed to facilitate or incentivize workforce participation (Clasen & Clegg, 2012; Jenson, 2011). Given that effective compensation systems

have historically relied on both skills development (including retraining) and income maintenance to help workers adjust to changes in the global economy (Katzenstein, 1985), we examine 'passive' and 'active' labor market spending jointly. However, we present disaggregated analysis in the online appendix.

We supplement our analysis of labor market spending with an examination of unemployment replacement rates using data from the Social Insurance Entitlements Database (SIED) developed by the Swedish Institute for Social Research (Nelson et al., 2024). Our main result focuses on the average unemployment benefit for a single worker after 26 weeks of unemployment spell as a percentage of an average production worker's wage.

III.   *Empirical Analysis*

We conduct a two-part empirical strategy to evaluate whether compensation conditions populist support. In Part A, we use as our outcome the election results from a panel of 16 countries between 1990 and 2021. In Part B, we examine the thesis further using eleven waves of the European Social Survey. In both analyses, we are interested primarily in two related analytical questions: (1) Do countries with comparatively high levels of compensatory spending on labor markets face lower levels of populist voting, controlling for other conditions? (2) Do changes in the generosity of labor market programs affect support for populist parties?

While it is impossible to fully disentangle the effects of cross-national differences from those of temporal change, we approximate this by estimating both multilevel models with random intercepts for country and fixed-effects models with country dummies. If the nature of the social-democratic welfare state limits the appeal of populist parties, we expect these parties to have lower *levels* of support in countries that spend more on compensation, all other things equal. If *changes*

in social spending, especially to more economically precarious segments of the population, affect electoral support, we expect populist parties to be more successful in countries that have cut more from earlier levels and less successful in countries that have increased spending compared to expected baselines. Conversely, if compensation dynamics are no longer effective, due to increases in immigration or other factors, than we expect to observe a null relationship or even a positive relationship between welfare spending and populist voting.

A: Social welfare spending and populist vote shares, 1990-2021

As a first evaluation of the relationship between social welfare spending and populist voting, we run ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions using an unbalanced panel of 134 parliamentary elections held in 16 European countries from 1990 to 2021. Following previous literature, the focus is on western European countries with established party systems and common social cleavages (Kriesi, 1998).[2] While we exclude the formerly communist countries of Eastern Europe because of differences in social cleavages and the structure of the welfare state full results with these countries included are provided in the appendix. Many of the broad relationships between social spending and populist voting found in western Europe can also be seen across all EU member states.

The dependent variable is the proportion of votes received by populist parties in national legislative elections. Our main explanatory variables of interest are the three welfare expenditure variables outlined earlier: (1) total social spending as a percentage of GDP; (2) public spending on labor markets as a percentage of GDP; (3) the unemployment insurance replacement rate for a single worker after 26 weeks of unemployment. By capturing different aspects of the generosity

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[2] The countries examined are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden and Switzerland.

of the welfare state, these measures in combination allow us to make an initial assessment of whether populist voting is on average lower in countries where compensation systems are more robust.

We include several economic controls. Because overall labor market spending reflects both short-term business cycles and structural labor market conditions, we control for each country's annual unemployment and labor force participation rates. Since the state of the macro-economy conditions support for populist parties (Rooduijn & Burgoon, 2018), we include a measure for per capita income. Given that deindustrialization is linked to the rise of populism, we include the share of industrial employment (Swank & Betz, 2003). We add a measure of national institutional quality, produced annually by Transparency International, to capture the fact that populist parties often position themselves as the solution to endemic institutional corruption. Since high inflation correlates with populist voting (Funke, Schularick, & Trebesch, 2023), we control for the national inflation rate. Finally, we account for immigration using Eurostat data on immigration flows. All independent variables are standardized. Table 1 presents summary statistics for the variables used in the panel analysis.

To measure the effect of changes in spending over time, we include country dummies in some of our models. By restricting the analysis to within-country variation, the country dummies allow us to assess the effect of within-country increases and decreases in spending. Because there are clearly important differences between rightwing and leftwing populist parties, we additionally examine each model with rightwing or leftwing radical parties as the dependent variable. For these categorizations, we once again rely upon Popu-List. To address the possibility of serial autocorrelation, we include country-specific linear time trends in the specification. This approach allows each country to follow its own gradual trajectory over time, thereby absorbing unobserved,

Table 1: Panel Summary Statistics

	mean	p50	count
Populist vote share	12.04	10.10	134
Rightwing vote share	8.46	6.20	134
Leftwing vote share	6.55	5.80	134
Social Spending (total, % GDP)	23.24	24.06	134
LMP Spending (total, % GDP)	1.87	1.76	134
UI Spending (% GDP)	1.22	1.13	134
UI Replacement Rate (single)	0.54	0.54	91
Unemployment Rate	8.06	6.99	134
Labor participation rate (%)	72.51	73.18	134
GDP Per Capita (USD)	55,213	51,845	134
Inflation Rate	2.32	1.95	134
Industrial Employment (%)	24.73	24.88	134
Corruption Perceptions Index (10=No Corruption)	7.40	7.85	134
Immigration Inflow (% of population)	0.01	0.01	134

unit-specific dynamics such as gradual cultural change or persistent macroeconomic conditions that could otherwise bias coefficient estimates. We retain year fixed effects to capture common shocks across European countries and cluster standard errors by country.

We begin by examining scatterplots of labor market compensation and populist vote share. As shown in Figure 3, populist support is generally higher in countries with lower labor market spending and lower unemployment replacement rates. This pattern reflects both cross-national differences in spending and populist vote shares, as well as within-country changes. For example, as illustrated in the left panel, Germany's labor market spending declined sharply following the 2003–2005 Hartz reforms, which spurred the creation of the left-wing populist party *Die Linke*. Since then, German populist vote shares have surged from 4% in 2002 to 22% in 2017.

Figure 3: The relationship between labor market compensation and populist vote share

Source: Calculations by authors using data from OECD and Social Policy Indicators Database.

In the right panel, we highlight the trajectory of Greece. Prior to the Eurozone crisis, the generosity of Greek unemployment insurance measured in earnings replacement rates was comparable to that of Scandinavian countries. Following the Troika-imposed structural adjustment programs, however, the system was transformed into one of the least generous in the EU. The sharp decline in unemployment insurance not only deepened the social costs of the crisis but also created fertile ground for political mobilization on the extremes, contributing to the rise of Syriza on the left and Golden Dawn on the right.

Table 2 presents results from the first stage of our analysis, which examines the relationship between equilibrium levels of social compensation and populist vote share. We observe a clear negative relationship between overall social spending and populism. Across all three measures—general social spending, labor market spending, and the unemployment insurance replacement rate—higher levels of compensation are associated with lower populist vote shares. This

Table 2, Determinants of Populist Vote Share

	Social Spending (RE)(1)	Social Spending (FE) (2)	Labor Market Spending (RE)(3)	Labor Market Spending (RE)(4)	UI RR - single (RE)(5)	UI RR – single (FE) (6)
Compensation	-1.011	-1.050	-4.815**	-4.784*	-8.782**	-8.762*
	(0.529)	(0.589)	(0.001)	(0.018)	(0.003)	(0.027)
Unemployment rate	1.453	1.515	3.751	3.780	-1.954	-1.974
	(0.671)	(0.715)	(0.246)	(0.341)	(0.552)	(0.627)
Labor Market Participation	1.645	1.608	3.116	3.061	4.311	4.139
	(0.388)	(0.491)	(0.094)	(0.187)	(0.363)	(0.480)
Per Capita Income	-11.51**	-11.60*	-11.13*	-11.13	-23.78*	-24.38
	(0.005)	(0.031)	(0.015)	(0.057)	(0.032)	(0.089)
Inflation Rate	-31.26	-29.90	-27.16	-25.86	-85.04	-85.31
	(0.214)	(0.333)	(0.143)	(0.257)	(0.462)	(0.552)
Industrial Employment (%)	-1.571	-1.533	-3.078	-3.030	-6.976	-6.641
	(0.697)	(0.754)	(0.332)	(0.437)	(0.282)	(0.412)
Corruption Perceptions Index	-1.680	-1.738	0.376	0.324	6.800	6.548
	(0.490)	(0.559)	(0.894)	(0.924)	(0.094)	(0.203)
Immigrant inflow (%)	-0.164	-0.154	-0.362	-0.354	-2.398	-2.372
	(0.919)	(0.937)	(0.792)	(0.831)	(0.392)	(0.493)
Constant	21.91***	3.983	23.38***	8.428**	39.98*	9.169
	(0.001)	(0.156)	(0.000)	(0.007)	(0.022)	(0.574)
Constant	-10.53***	--	-10.57***	--	-10.30***	--
	(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)	
Constant	1.707***	--	1.653***	--	1.647***	--
	(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)	
Observations	134	134	134	134	91	91
Adjusted R^2		0.553		0.598		0.585

p-values in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

relationship is strongest and most robust for labor market spending: countries that devote more resources to supporting the unemployed and provide more generous replacement rates tend to have lower support for populist parties. At the same time most of our controls are not significant predictors. While higher per capita income predicts lower populist vote shares, inflation, industrial employment, institutional quality, and immigration rates are not systematically related.

Table 2 also reports estimates from models with two-way fixed effects, which account for all time-invariant country characteristics and common year shocks (Columns 2, 4, and 6). We continue to observe clear negative correlations between labor market compensation and populist vote share. Substantively, the estimates imply that a 10-percentage-point increase in a country's

Table 3, Determinants of Far-right and Far-left Vote Share

	Social Spend - RW (FE) (1)	Social Spend - LW (FE) (2)	Labor Market Spend - RW (FE) (3)	Labor Market Spend - LW (FE)(4)	UI RR - RW (FE) (5)	UI RR - LW (FE) (6)
Compensation	-1.985 (0.188)	0.747 (0.505)	-1.795 (0.084)	-3.617*** (0.001)	-4.802** (0.007)	-1.881 (0.361)
Unemployment rate	-2.516 (0.144)	2.683 (0.132)	-1.858 (0.263)	4.583** (0.001)	-5.122** (0.006)	3.015 (0.328)
Labor Market Participation	-0.0207 (0.984)	1.142 (0.369)	0.630 (0.641)	2.139 (0.079)	2.808 (0.447)	2.546 (0.431)
Per Capita Income	-4.327 (0.140)	2.616 (0.448)	-2.900 (0.311)	1.755 (0.569)	-4.144 (0.466)	3.725 (0.674)
Inflation Rate	-16.02 (0.208)	-15.35 (0.386)	-11.52 (0.295)	-15.19 (0.176)	-37.85 (0.653)	-29.17 (0.727)
Industrial Employment (%)	-1.101 (0.638)	-1.482 (0.602)	-1.205 (0.494)	-3.058 (0.177)	-6.138 (0.229)	-2.157 (0.610)
Corruption Perceptions Index	-6.182** (0.009)	1.698 (0.347)	-5.390* (0.035)	3.241* (0.026)	-5.820 (0.105)	1.388 (0.671)
Immigrant inflow (%)	0.194 (0.838)	-1.026 (0.373)	0.141 (0.884)	-1.198 (0.280)	-0.196 (0.916)	-1.991 (0.092)
Constant	3.648* (0.038)	5.346* (0.037)	6.093** (0.004)	7.956** (0.002)	14.82 (0.186)	-0.660 (0.946)
Observations	134	134	134	134	91	91
Adjusted R^2	0.791	0.693	0.795	0.761	0.769	0.672

p-values in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

unemployment replacement rate corresponds to a 30% reduction in predicted populist vote share, falling from 7.1% to 5%. Given that most countries have reduced benefit generosity over this period, particularly for long-term unemployment, these retrenchments may help explain the sustained rise of populist parties.

In Table 3, we present models with far-right and far-left vote shares as the dependent variables. Several macroeconomic covariates emerge as significant predictors. In some models, higher unemployment rates are linked to lower right-wing support but higher left-wing support, while stronger institutional quality corresponds to reduced right-wing vote shares.

The compensation variables are less consistent predictors of far-right and far-left voting than they were of overall populist support. Social spending is not strongly correlated with either both right- or left-wing vote shares. Labor market spending, by contrast, emerges as a more

consistent predictor: higher levels of such spending are negatively correlated with left-wing vote shares, while higher unemployment insurance replacement rates are negatively correlated with right-wing vote shares. Taken together, these results suggest that more generous labor market policies may also dampen support for parties at both extremes of the political spectrum.

B. Welfare Spending and Populist Voters: A Multi-Level Analysis

While the panel analysis provides evidence that lower levels of compensation and decreases in spending over time are associated with higher populist vote shares, it does not allow us to control for individual-level characteristics that might affect support for populist parties. By constructing multi-level models that combine country-level statistics with individual-level survey data, we can more precisely identify which parts of the population are voting for populist parties and determine whether and how these groups' political preferences are affected by the level and type of spending on labor markets and other welfare measures. This approach, common in political economy studies (Abou-Chadi & Wagner, 2019), makes possible an analysis of both between and within unit variation while still taking into account the nested structure of the data (Bell & Jones, 2015).

To analyze the determinants of populist voting, we estimate multilevel logistic regression models with random intercepts for countries and clustered standard errors, as well as OLS linear probability models with two-way fixed effects. We use eleven waves of the European Social Survey, a semi-annual survey of public attitudes conducted by the European Research Infrastructure Consortium, to assess the determinants of populist voting in 84 of the 95 national parliamentary elections that occurred in our 16 countries over the period 1999-2021. Our dependent variable is a binary indicator of whether a respondent reported voting for a populist

party in the previous election.[3] Since the question asks respondents who they supported in the previous election, responses are coded for the relevant election year. Where more than one survey was taken between an election, we include only one survey-wave.

Previous research has found that unemployment and experiences of economic hardship increases the likelihood of supporting leftwing populist parties (Kurer, 2020) while individuals in routine occupations more vulnerable to globalization or technology-induced disruption are more likely to support right-wing populist parties (Colantone & Stanig, 2018; Oesch, 2008; Oesch & Rennwald, 2018). The ESS survey includes several questions that make it possible to assess whether individual economic circumstances shape support for populism. The first is a question that asks whether an individual has ever experienced three months or more of unemployment. We include a dummy variable in the regressions that indicates whether a respondent has this prior unemployment experience. The second is a question that asks an individual whether they are "living comfortably," "coping", "finding it difficult" or "finding it very difficult" on their current household income. We create dummy variables for each of these responses, excluding "living comfortably" from the regression analysis.

Previous research has found that immigration preferences condition support for redistribution (Burgoon, 2014) and can shape how the public responds to changes in social welfare expenditures (Burgoon & Rooduijn, 2021). We therefore include a question asking recipients to assess whether immigration makes a country a worse or better place to live.

Because we are now analyzing individuals, we add a number of demographic controls, including gender and age. Since we expect the relationship between age and populism to be non-

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[3] The main results report the likelihood of all respondents, covering both voters and non-voters. In the online appendix, we report models excluding those who were ineligible to vote, did not vote, or otherwise did not respond to the question.

linear, we include dummy indicators for six different age tranches, using respondents under 30 as the reference group. We also include a range of standard individual-level covariates commonly used in studies of populism, including indicators for living in an urban, suburban, small town, village or rural community, educational attainment and occupational characteristics.

To categorize educational attainment, we rely on an ESS question about schooling that has been harmonized into the International Standard of Classification (ISCED) developed by the United National Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). The ISCED classification divides educational attainment into five tiers ranging from "less than lower secondary" to "higher tertiary education." We exclude the largest category of education—those with lower secondary attainment (ISCED II). To categorize occupation, we use a question from the ESS that asks respondents to state their current or former occupation, which is subsequently classified into the ten-tiered International Standard Classification of Occupation (ISCO) developed by the International Labour Organization. In all of our models, we exclude the mid-skill category of clerk. More information about these indicators is available in the online appendix.

We include five macro-economic indicators used previously: the unemployment rate, the labor force participation rate, the inflation rate, GDP per capita, and the industrial employment rate. As before, we also assess whether perceived institutional quality or immigrant inflows condition outcomes. Standard errors are clustered at the country level, and year dummies are included to capture common shocks. All models are adjusted for both the post-stratification weight, which adjusts for sampling and nonresponse biases within each country, and the population size weight, which ensures that each country's contribution reflects its share of the total European population.

Table 4, Determinants of Populist Voting

	Total social spend (RE)(M1a)	Total social spend (FE)(M1b)	Labor market spending (RE)(M2a)	Labor market spending (FE)(M2b)	UI RR - single (RE)(M3a)	UI RR - single (FE) (M3b)
Compensation	-0.210 (0.634)	-0.00202 (0.949)	-1.069* (0.014)	-0.0731*** (0.001)	-1.787 (0.198)	-0.104*** (0.000)
Unemployment rate	-0.909* (0.012)	-0.0234 (0.466)	-0.0320 (0.928)	0.0242 (0.283)	-0.917** (0.001)	-0.0368** (0.004)
Labor Market Participation	-0.396 (0.328)	0.0149 (0.724)	-0.453 (0.294)	0.00420 (0.908)	-0.436 (0.224)	0.00368 (0.837)
Per Capita Income	-1.887 (0.085)	-0.0330 (0.752)	-1.096 (0.255)	-0.0369 (0.434)	-0.918 (0.443)	0.0169 (0.718)
Inflation Rate	-0.342 (0.215)	-0.0196 (0.249)	-0.437 (0.096)	-0.0211 (0.143)	-0.172 (0.316)	0.000645 (0.964)
Industrial Employment (%)	-2.999*** (0.000)	-0.156** (0.003)	-2.539*** (0.000)	-0.122** (0.003)	-2.822*** (0.000)	-0.149*** (0.000)
Corruption Perceptions Index	0.509 (0.091)	0.0673 (0.080)	0.502 (0.108)	0.0547** (0.004)	0.373 (0.356)	0.0492* (0.011)
Immigrant inflow (%)	0.210 (0.280)	0.00506 (0.790)	0.264 (0.149)	0.00996 (0.480)	0.0121 (0.932)	-0.0135 (0.286)
Male	0.218*** (0.000)	0.0166*** (0.000)	0.218*** (0.000)	0.0167*** (0.000)	0.218*** (0.000)	0.0166*** (0.000)
Age: 30's	0.0695 (0.108)	0.00558 (0.202)	0.0695 (0.107)	0.00561 (0.127)	0.0634 (0.130)	0.00507 (0.157)
Age: 40's	0.108 (0.069)	0.00885 (0.155)	0.107 (0.071)	0.00878 (0.144)	0.104 (0.074)	0.00854 (0.153)
Age: 50's	0.0475 (0.430)	0.00462 (0.332)	0.0480 (0.425)	0.00468 (0.295)	0.0430 (0.470)	0.00419 (0.340)
Age: 60's	-0.0337 (0.567)	-0.00235 (0.626)	-0.0336 (0.567)	-0.00232 (0.633)	-0.0371 (0.490)	-0.00256 (0.579)
Age: 70's	-0.223* (0.018)	-0.0170 (0.075)	-0.223* (0.018)	-0.0170* (0.046)	-0.227* (0.019)	-0.0173* (0.046)
Education: Less than lower secondary	-0.232 (0.064)	-0.0133 (0.112)	-0.231 (0.067)	-0.0132 (0.109)	-0.224 (0.079)	-0.0128 (0.122)
Education: Upper secondary	0.172* (0.031)	0.0129 (0.073)	0.174* (0.027)	0.0131 (0.055)	0.176* (0.025)	0.0132 (0.054)
Education: Advanced vocational	0.272 (0.110)	0.0205 (0.157)	0.276 (0.101)	0.0209 (0.131)	0.282 (0.095)	0.0212 (0.123)
Education: Tertiary education	-0.0349 (0.862)	-0.00149 (0.909)	-0.0320 (0.873)	-0.00119 (0.925)	-0.0283 (0.887)	-0.00117 (0.927)
Routine skills	-0.0706 (0.310)	-0.00297 (0.676)	-0.0698 (0.322)	-0.00284 (0.626)	-0.0713 (0.319)	-0.00294 (0.617)
Machinist	0.109* (0.043)	0.00937 (0.267)	0.109* (0.042)	0.00948 (0.122)	0.106* (0.049)	0.00921 (0.133)
Craft Worker	0.0651 (0.182)	0.00638 (0.343)	0.0644 (0.186)	0.00631 (0.158)	0.0633 (0.210)	0.00621 (0.177)
Skilled Agriculturalist	0.0471 (0.773)	0.00645 (0.658)	0.0443 (0.786)	0.00631 (0.589)	0.0245 (0.874)	0.00509 (0.646)
Service Worker	0.0344 (0.379)	0.00432 (0.232)	0.0323 (0.417)	0.00416 (0.161)	0.0330 (0.409)	0.00419 (0.161)

Technician	0.109 (0.061)	0.00884 (0.151)	0.108 (0.068)	0.00872 (0.087)	0.107 (0.077)	0.00868 (0.095)
Professional	0.0349 (0.791)	0.00226 (0.817)	0.0341 (0.797)	0.00218 (0.825)	0.0384 (0.772)	0.00274 (0.782)
Manager	0.0244 (0.846)	0.00160 (0.858)	0.0288 (0.819)	0.00193 (0.823)	0.0232 (0.857)	0.00187 (0.831)
Army	-0.0948 (0.644)	-0.00772 (0.692)	-0.0990 (0.630)	-0.00836 (0.604)	-0.124 (0.548)	-0.0106 (0.516)
Trade Union Member	0.389* (0.015)	0.0299* (0.025)	0.388* (0.016)	0.0297* (0.022)	0.390* (0.016)	0.0302* (0.020)
City	0.126 (0.340)	0.00930 (0.335)	0.125 (0.344)	0.00919 (0.341)	0.127 (0.337)	0.00934 (0.332)
Suburb	0.000389 (0.993)	0.000314 (0.951)	0.00102 (0.982)	0.000338 (0.920)	-0.00128 (0.977)	0.000307 (0.926)
Village	-0.0334 (0.641)	-0.00240 (0.686)	-0.0338 (0.637)	-0.00244 (0.682)	-0.0341 (0.636)	-0.00241 (0.689)
Farm	0.00521 (0.976)	0.00128 (0.934)	0.00726 (0.967)	0.00128 (0.929)	0.00833 (0.962)	0.00152 (0.916)
Positive view about immigration	-0.153*** (0.000)	-0.0123*** (0.001)	-0.153*** (0.000)	-0.0123*** (0.000)	-0.153*** (0.000)	-0.0123*** (0.000)
Prior Unemployment Experience	0.195* (0.016)	0.0143* (0.034)	0.194* (0.016)	0.0142* (0.028)	0.197* (0.016)	0.0146* (0.024)
Economic Situation: Coping	0.184 (0.137)	0.0130 (0.166)	0.183 (0.140)	0.0130 (0.143)	0.187 (0.133)	0.0133 (0.134)
Economic Situation: Difficult	0.242 (0.171)	0.0189 (0.141)	0.242 (0.170)	0.0188 (0.134)	0.248 (0.162)	0.0193 (0.122)
Economic Situation: Very Difficult	0.0940 (0.658)	0.00793 (0.607)	0.0951 (0.653)	0.00817 (0.589)	0.111 (0.597)	0.0102 (0.490)
Constant	-3.952*** (0.000)	0.0665 (0.264)	-3.040*** (0.000)	0.112*** (0.001)	-3.432** (0.002)	0.0806* (0.023)
var(_cons[country2])	3.265 (0.064)		3.221 (0.071)		3.973 (0.198)	
Observations	109106	113184	109106	113184	104853	108931
Adjusted R^2		0.067		0.067		0.069

p-values in parentheses
$^*\ p < 0.05, ^{**}\ p < 0.01, ^{***}\ p < 0.001$

Table 4 reports the regression results. For each of the three dependent variables, we estimate both multi-level logit models with random country intercepts (RE) and OLS linear probability models with two-way fixed effects (FE). As expected, many of the control variables are statistically significant. At the country-year level, higher levels of industrial employment are associated with lower populist vote shares, consistent with previous findings that deindustrialization has fuelled populist support. At the individual level, men are more likely to

vote for populist parties as are those who hold negative views about immigrants. Machine workers and current or former union members are also more likely to support populist parties. By contrast, many education, occupation, and domicile indicators are not statistically significant, perhaps reflecting differences in which social groups are drawn to right- versus left-wing populism.

The results also provide support for our compensation hypothesis. While total social spending does not show a systematic relationship with populist voting, both measures of labor market programs do. Individuals are less likely to support populist parties in countries that allocate a larger share of resources to labor market programs and where unemployment insurance replaces a greater share of previous earnings. This pattern is consistent across both the random-effects logit models and the fixed-effects linear probability models.

Finally, those who have either experienced unemployment or view their household finances as precarious are consistently more likely to support populist parties. Across all specifications, individuals who have been unemployed for at least three months show a higher probability of voting populist. These findings align with existing literature that links job disruption and adverse economic circumstances to higher levels of populist support.

Table 5 reports results when we separately examine right-wing and left-wing populist voting as dependent variables. Disaggregating the dependent variable highlights important differences between the constituencies of right- and left-wing populist parties that have also been found in previous research (Rooduijn et al., 2017). Supporters of right-wing populist parties are more likely to be male, to live outside cities, and to lack tertiary education, whereas left-wing populist voters are more likely to reside in urban areas and to have completed university studies. Immigration preferences also diverge: right-wing voters hold negative views about immigrants while left-wing voters positive views. Left-wing voters are also more likely to have experienced

Table 5, Determinants of Rightwing and Leftwing Voting

	Total Social Spend – RW (FE)(M1b)	Total Social Spend – LW (M1b)	Total LMP Spend - RW (FE)(M2b)	Total LMP Spending - LW (FE)(M2b)	UI RR - RW (FE)(M3b)	UI RR - LW (FE)(M3b)
Compensation	-0.0275 (0.339)	0.0283 (0.071)	-0.00524 (0.595)	-0.0353*** (0.001)	-0.0123 (0.341)	-0.0256* (0.020)
Unemployment rate	-0.0189 (0.155)	-0.00556 (0.631)	-0.00758 (0.577)	0.00901 (0.407)	-0.0117 (0.360)	-0.0177 (0.060)
Labor Market Participation	0.0248 (0.502)	0.00489 (0.752)	0.0436* (0.050)	-0.0212 (0.092)	0.0431* (0.032)	-0.0193* (0.021)
Per Capita Income	-0.0383 (0.331)	0.0668 (0.116)	0.00126 (0.975)	0.0222 (0.265)	0.0110 (0.792)	0.0384 (0.130)
Inflation Rate	-0.00669 (0.678)	0.00108 (0.855)	-0.0139 (0.510)	0.00787 (0.122)	-0.0111 (0.598)	0.0129* (0.014)
Industrial Employment (%)	-0.0610* (0.027)	-0.0598*** (0.001)	-0.0435* (0.047)	-0.0591*** (0.001)	-0.0467* (0.044)	-0.0761*** (0.000)
Corruption Perceptions Index	-0.0190 (0.163)	0.0188 (0.151)	-0.0116 (0.590)	0.00382 (0.663)	-0.0110 (0.672)	0.000661 (0.953)
Immigrant inflow (%)	0.00613 (0.706)	-0.0164 (0.067)	0.0120 (0.295)	-0.0200* (0.017)	0.00896 (0.419)	-0.0286** (0.001)
Male	0.0105*** (0.000)	0.00207 (0.430)	0.0105*** (0.000)	0.00209 (0.358)	0.0105*** (0.000)	0.00208 (0.365)
Age: 30's	0.00928* (0.022)	-0.00470 (0.306)	0.00929* (0.011)	-0.00470 (0.223)	0.00885* (0.016)	-0.00475 (0.223)
Age: 40's	0.0107*** (0.001)	-0.00712 (0.058)	0.0107*** (0.000)	-0.00716** (0.006)	0.0105*** (0.000)	-0.00727** (0.005)
Age: 50's	0.00392 (0.314)	0.00221 (0.533)	0.00395 (0.283)	0.00221 (0.395)	0.00362 (0.311)	0.00210 (0.421)
Age: 60's	0.00310 (0.478)	-0.00410 (0.444)	0.00315 (0.436)	-0.00413 (0.334)	0.00285 (0.433)	-0.00417 (0.335)
Age: 70's	-0.00741* (0.045)	-0.00221 (0.570)	-0.00742** (0.002)	-0.00221 (0.308)	-0.00761** (0.002)	-0.00222 (0.314)
Education: Less than lower secondary	-0.00914 (0.060)	-0.00160 (0.766)	-0.00927* (0.031)	-0.00140 (0.708)	-0.00893* (0.036)	-0.00144 (0.702)
Education: Upper secondary	0.00574 (0.279)	0.00863 (0.086)	0.00575 (0.190)	0.00876 (0.067)	0.00568 (0.185)	0.00877 (0.070)
Education: Advanced vocational	0.00125 (0.795)	0.0223* (0.042)	0.00129 (0.765)	0.0224* (0.035)	0.00118 (0.778)	0.0226* (0.034)
Education: Tertiary education	-0.00945 (0.100)	0.0220* (0.015)	-0.00945 (0.062)	0.0222* (0.015)	-0.00933 (0.061)	0.0222* (0.016)
Routine skills	0.00311 (0.508)	-0.00586 (0.174)	0.00315 (0.451)	-0.00583* (0.042)	0.00301 (0.476)	-0.00586* (0.046)
Machinist	0.0113 (0.217)	-0.00244 (0.599)	0.0113 (0.116)	-0.00239 (0.482)	0.0112 (0.122)	-0.00245 (0.478)
Craft Worker	0.00804 (0.141)	-0.00241 (0.690)	0.00804 (0.069)	-0.00245 (0.640)	0.00786 (0.078)	-0.00245 (0.643)
Skilled Agriculturalist	0.00579 (0.609)	0.00127 (0.820)	0.00570 (0.596)	0.00129 (0.713)	0.00427 (0.666)	0.00140 (0.695)

Service Worker	0.00309 (0.284)	-0.00298 (0.550)	0.00301 (0.214)	-0.00299 (0.506)	0.00300 (0.211)	-0.00299 (0.511)
Technician	-0.00173 (0.542)	0.00650 (0.275)	-0.00181 (0.547)	0.00651 (0.241)	-0.00185 (0.544)	0.00657 (0.241)
Professional	-0.00507 (0.398)	0.00664 (0.194)	-0.00508 (0.399)	0.00661 (0.127)	-0.00507 (0.405)	0.00679 (0.119)
Manager	-0.000640 (0.888)	-0.00441 (0.634)	-0.000600 (0.875)	-0.00427 (0.615)	-0.00103 (0.794)	-0.00429 (0.617)
Army	0.0109 (0.374)	-0.00995 (0.535)	0.0109 (0.099)	-0.0103 (0.416)	0.00955 (0.139)	-0.0104 (0.415)
Trade Union Member	0.00591 (0.065)	0.0365** (0.001)	0.00588* (0.014)	0.0364** (0.001)	0.00583* (0.011)	0.0369*** (0.001)
City	-0.00384* (0.034)	0.0170* (0.028)	-0.00385* (0.040)	0.0169* (0.025)	-0.00385* (0.043)	0.0171* (0.024)
Suburb	-0.00279 (0.378)	0.00344 (0.431)	-0.00286 (0.281)	0.00353 (0.319)	-0.00312 (0.221)	0.00366 (0.310)
Village	0.00309 (0.371)	-0.000506 (0.882)	0.00308 (0.334)	-0.000514 (0.883)	0.00303 (0.344)	-0.000469 (0.895)
Farm	0.0170 (0.073)	-0.00490 (0.231)	0.0170* (0.030)	-0.00486 (0.182)	0.0174* (0.025)	-0.00492 (0.186)
Positive view about immigration	-0.0140*** (0.000)	0.00484** (0.001)	-0.0139*** (0.000)	0.00481*** (0.001)	-0.0139*** (0.000)	0.00486*** (0.001)
Prior Unemployment Experience	0.000345 (0.890)	0.0171*** (0.001)	0.000347 (0.893)	0.0170** (0.001)	0.000354 (0.891)	0.0173** (0.001)
Economic Situation: Coping	0.000685 (0.872)	0.0147* (0.016)	0.000704 (0.853)	0.0146* (0.013)	0.000710 (0.853)	0.0149* (0.012)
Economic Situation: Difficult	0.000226 (0.979)	0.0203* (0.012)	0.000218 (0.979)	0.0203* (0.010)	0.000381 (0.963)	0.0206* (0.010)
Economic Situation: Very Difficult	-0.00967 (0.364)	0.0179 (0.106)	-0.00964 (0.351)	0.0180 (0.084)	-0.00921 (0.372)	0.0184 (0.078)
Constant	0.118*** (0.000)	-0.0691* (0.023)	0.0892*** (0.000)	-0.0129 (0.416)	0.0863*** (0.000)	-0.0319 (0.116)
Observations	113184	113184	113184	113184	108931	108931
Adjusted R^2	0.062	0.037	0.062	0.037	0.062	0.037

p-values in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$
Source: Author's calculations using the European Social Survey.

extended unemployment and to report facing adverse economic circumstances. Trade union members, by contrast, are more likely than their respective baselines to support both far right and far left parties.

We also gain new insight into the relationship between labor market compensation and populism. As shown in Table 5, higher spending on unemployment programs is negatively

associated with support for left-wing populist parties. This relationship appears robust: increases in labor market spending and higher unemployment replacement rates both predict lower likelihoods of voting for the far left. By contrast, we do not find a statistically significant association between labor market spending and voting for the far right.

To probe whether the observed relationships between compensation and populist voting may be causal, we estimate several interaction model. We focus on three groups where populist voting is especially likely and where labor market spending may be most impactful: current or former trade union members, and individuals with prior unemployment experience. If unemployment protection influences populist support, then these groups should become less likely to back populist parties when unemployment benefits are more generous. To probe the rival welfare chauvinist hypothesis, we also estimate the interaction model for immigration preferences and the UI replacement rate.

Figure 4 presents coefficient plots from the interaction models for populist, right-wing, and left-wing voting. The results indicate that, under more generous unemployment insurance systems, groups otherwise most prone to populist voting – union members and individuals with unemployment experience – are predicted to exhibit lower support for populist parties and left-wing parties than they would under less generous systems. Similarly, individuals with more pro-immigrant attitudes are predicted to be less supportive of populist and right-wing parties at higher levels of unemployment replacement, although this effect does not reach conventional levels of statistical significance ($p < 0.05$).

These counterfactual simulations imply that the negative association between labor-market support and populist voting reflects a potentially causal relationship: when social protection increases, the marginal propensity to vote populist among core populist constituencies such as

Figure 4: Impact of UI changes on populist support

Source: Author's calculations using the European Social Survey. All macro-variables are standardized.

current and former labor union members declines relative to conditions of weaker protection.
While the analysis also indicates that this effect may be stronger among individuals with pro-immigration views, it also remains when controlling for these views and when examining only individuals with negative views of immigrants.[4] Taken together, the results suggest that welfare institutions do plausibly shape the political preferences of key constituencies otherwise most disposed toward populism.

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[4] See the online appendix for results limited to individuals with negative views of immigration.

Figure 5: An individual's predicted likelihood of supporting a populist party at different unemployment replacement rates

Figure 5 illustrates the substantive significance of the relationship between UI generosity and voting for a populist or far-left party, using the interaction model reported in Figure 4. A 5-percentage-point increase in the unemployment insurance replacement rate reduces the predicted probability of an average individual voting populist from 8.2% to 6%, when all other variables are held at their means. For a current or former trade union member, the effect is even stronger, dropping from a 9.1% to 6.8% likelihood of voting populist. This represents a sharp decline, underscoring how more generous social protection may substantially dampen the electoral appeal of populist parties.

IV. Discussion and Conclusion

Our analysis provides insights into the relationship between labor market spending and support for populist parties. First, we found that higher levels of compensatory spending for unemployed workers is associated with smaller shares of votes for populist parties in national elections held in 16 European countries. We identify a consistent negative correlation between labor market spending and populist vote shares and unemployment insurance generosity and populist vote shares across multiple models and controlling for a wide array of macro-economic indicators. Notably, this robust relationship is not observed when we examine overall social welfare spending, social cash transfers or social services spending.[5]

On the second dimension, we found evidence that reductions in spending on income maintenance since the 1990's, and austerity measures pursued following the crisis, contributed to the rising electoral fortunes of populist parties on the right and left. In the panel analysis conducted in Part IIIA, we found that within-country decreases in labor market spending are associated with higher populist vote shares. In the multi-level analyses conducted in Part IIIB, we found similarly that reduced labor market support is associated with a higher likelihood that voters will support a populist party or a far-left party. The effect is particularly pronounced among current and former trade union members and among those individuals who have previously experienced unemployment.

These observed relationships are observed across multiple model specifications in two independently generated datasets that cover different lengths of time. They also are robust when we exclude non-voters from the analysis; when we remove occupation and education; when we limit the analysis to those opposed to immigration; and when we exclude particular European

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[5] See the online appendix for results with social cash transfers and social services spending.

regions and countries from the analysis. The basic results also remain when using alternative measures of unemployment generosity and different measures of immigration such as the size of the foreign-born population. Some key results are even present when we expand the number of countries to include eastern Europe which have historically structured labor market support quite differently.[6]

Our findings suggest that long-term commitments to social programs aimed at insulating workers from the risk of economic disruption limits populist voting, while cuts to these programs, whether as a result of labor market reform or austerity, have contributed to the electoral success of populist parties. Even after holding immigration attitudes constant, higher levels of labor-market compensation continue to reduce the predicted probability of supporting populist parties, suggesting that the dampening effect of social protection operates independently of immigration preferences. All in all, our evidence suggests that the compensation hypothesis is still relevant for explaining the rise of populism (Vlandas & Halikiopoulou, 2022). And it suggests that in core areas of the welfare state such as unemployment insurance, the logic of compensation still holds its own against the welfare chauvinist logic that may predominate in other welfare state arenas (Burgoon & Schakel, 2022).

Since these results are observational, we should be cautious about causal interpretations. The consistent negative correlations between labor market expenditures and populist vote share could relate to factors omitted from this analysis, while the association between labor market reform and increased austerity on the one hand, and the rising fortunes of populist parties on the other hand, may reflect parallel historical trends which are not causally related. However, there are reasons to think that these relationships are not coincidental.

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[6] See the online appendix for these alternative models.

First, while there are some common movements, there is significant variation in both welfare spending and populist voting in the period examined. The model specifications we developed isolate this variation, controlling to the extent possible common historical developments through year fixed effects.

Second, we explored some of the micro-foundations of a potential causal link, demonstrating that many of the individuals most likely to support populist parties – including trade union members, and those who have experienced sustained periods of unemployment – become more likely to support populist parties when faced with cuts to spending on unemployment insurance programs and reductions in replacement rates. We have also shown that the relationship is strongest in the welfare spending area that provides the most direct and immediate relief to those left facing economic distress, and which is most strongly supported by populist voters.

Finally, we have demonstrated that the observed relationship is robust to a variety of specifications and controls. Across multiple models and measures of spending, we have shown that populist parties are weaker in countries that spend more on compensation, and that cuts to welfare spending, as a result of labor market reform and austerity, are strongly associated with rising support for populist parties. Furthermore, we have identified plausible mechanisms by which compensation may affect political preferences by dampening the effects of globalization and technological change on livelihoods and thereby reducing the grievances among the groups most affected.

Conclusion

Europe's political systems are under challenge from populist movements and parties that reject core aspects of the post-World War Two regional and international order. This challenge brings to mind

long-standing arguments that the insecurity generated by economic change could be politically explosive if the concerns of those harmed were not addressed with adequate "compensatory" social policies (Kapstein, 1994; Rodrik, 1998; Ruggie, 1994).

Indeed, we find that higher levels of labor market spending help moderate support for populism among those who have seen their relative economic and social status decline. We also find that as European governments have cut unemployment and other programs that maintain incomes for established, full-time workers, these cutbacks have fueled support for populist parties opposed to core principles of European integration. Reductions in spending, especially on unemployment insurance and other passive labor market policies, have stimulated support for populism. These effects are most pronounced among the occupational and educational groups whose jobs are most vulnerable to deindustrialization and technological change, and among individuals who have experienced unemployment.

Our analysis suggests that appropriate social policies can limit the populist backlash, while labor market reforms and austerity measures can stimulate such a backlash. The relevant social and labor-market policies may be essential to long-term political stability. While a good case can be made for spending more on education and childcare, as well as programs that support refugees, the disabled, and other vulnerable individuals, these investments need not come at the expense of traditional compensatory programs such as unemployment insurance. The policy implications are clear – even if the political path to implementing appropriate policies is not.

Online Appendix

This appendix provides additional information about the data used in the paper and the coding choices used in "Compensation, Austerity and Populism: Labor Market Spending and Voting in 16 Western European Countries." In the first section of the appendix, we provide links to data sources as well as definitions of data used in both the country panel analysis and the pooled analysis of the European Social Survey. In the second part, we provide several alternative specifications and robustness checks for our main result.

First, we examine two additional multi-level model specifications: (1) models with random intercepts for both country and year; and (2) models with a random intercept for country-year (or country–survey wave). We also subject our OLS linear probability models to various robustness checks, including alternative measures of unemployment insurance generosity and labor market spending; alternative immigration measures; and an expanded sample that covers eight Eastern European countries. In Appendix 3, we provide a full list of parties classified as populist, radical right or radical left. More extensive information about coding choices are available upon request. All data used in the analysis is available upon request.

Appendix 1: Additional information about Data Sources

Panel analysis

In the first part of the empirical analysis, we examine an unbalanced panel of 134 parliamentary elections held in 17 western European countries from 1990 to 2021. The countries examined are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, and Switzerland. We do not include the formerly communist countries of Eastern Europe because of differences in the structure of the welfare state and the character of populist parties in these countries. We exclude Iceland, Liechtenstein, Cyprus, or Malta because of data limitations. The dependent variable is the proportion of votes received by populist parties in each election. Results of presidential, local, and regional elections are excluded, as are elections to upper chambers. In France, we examine the first round of voting in National Assembly elections.

Since majoritarian electoral systems alter the strategies of voters, results from elections using plurality voting rules, we exclude the UK. We include the first-round results for the French national parliament, which also uses a plurality voting system, because the two-round election encourages voters to support their first-choice preference during the first round, much as in PR systems.

Depending on which analysis we are conducting, our dependent variable is always the proportion of votes received in an election year by populist, radical right, or radical left parties, respectively. To categorize parties, we rely on *PopuList*, an overview of populist parties developed by a consortium of political scientists. The Populist identifies parties that are populist, far right, far left, and/or Euroskeptic, and which received at least 2% of the vote in at least one national parliamentary election since 1998. The list has been peer reviewed by more than 30 academics specializing in European parties. For more information see https://popu-list.org. We use a 2023 version of the list. While there is significant overlap between populist parties and radical parties, these are not coextensive. The list also identifies several "borderline cases," which we qualitatively code based on our own judgment. For instance, we choose to not classify Forza Italia and House of Freedom as populist given their mainstream policy positions. We also choose to classify the Dutch Socialist party as non-populist and non-radical given their social democratic orientation since 2002. All other 'borderline cases' are coded as populist.

National election results for parties identified by the *PopuList* are taken from the Timbro Authoritarian Populism Index (https://populismindex.com), and confirmed with the European Election Database (https://nsd.no/european_election_database/about/). For national-level results from European Parliamentary elections we code the totals using the European Union's reported election results, using national parties as a guide where possible: < https://election-results.eu/>. All of these totals were cross-checked for accuracy three times, including once by a research assistant.

Our main explanatory variables of interest are three social expenditure variables: (1) total social spending as a percentage of GDP; (2) public spending on labor markets as a percentage of GDP; (3) the unemployment insurance replacement rate for a single person after six months as a percentage of the national median wage. The expenditure data is generated by the OECD's

Social Expenditure Database, available at < https://www.oecd.org/social/expenditure.htm>. The UI replacement rate data is from the Social Insurance Entitlements Database (SIED) developed by the Swedish Institute for Social Research (Nelson et al., 2024). This data is cross-checked with data from the Comparative Welfare Entitlements Project (CWEP) measures devised by Scruggs (2018).

We also include several additional variables in most of the models. The institutional quality variable is from Transparency International's "Corruption Perceptions Index." See < https://www.transparency.org/cpi2018>. The measures for income and deindustrialization come from the World Bank. Unemployment data comes from the IMF, immigration data comes from Eurostat, and labor participation rate data from the OECD.

European Social Survey Analysis

We use OLS regressions to analyze eleven waves of the European Social Survey, a semi-annual survey of public attitudes in 32 countries, conducted by the European Research Infrastructure Consortium. All western European countries are analyzed except for Iceland, Malta, Cyprus, and Liechtenstein. Since we are only examining national parliamentary elections, we exclude the United Kingdom, given its first-past-the-post electoral system. This leaves a total of 16 countries: 11 with complete results and give participation in 2-8 waves.[7] All of the models are weighted by country population and include year dummies. For more on ESS weighting see <https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/docs/methodology/ESS_weighting_data_1.pdf>).

We develop two approaches to coding populism. Initially, we include all respondents in our analysis. A vote for a populist party is coded as "1," a vote for a non-populist party as "0," and all non-votes, refusals, "don't know," and "no answer" responses are also coded as "0." This approach allows us to analyze a larger sample of voters. The resulting variables are populist, rightwing, and leftwing. We additionally develop a second measure that treats non-voters and non-responses as missing. For populist2, rightwing2, and leftwing2, a vote for a populist party is coded as "1," a vote for a non-populist party as "0," and all non-votes, refusals, "don't know," and "no answer" responses are coded as missing. This approach limits our analysis to respondents who clearly recall voting for a specific party.

Occupational classifications are based on the International standard classification of occupations, or ISCO, which is used in the European Social Survey. See classification below. Table A provides information about the populist vote share disaggregated by occupation as well as the proportion of the population following into each occupational category.
**100 Armed forces
**1000 Legislators, senior officials and managers
**2000 Professionals

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[7] The countries examined are Austria (7), Belgium (11), Switzerland (11), Germany (11), Denmark (8), Spain (11), Finland (11), France (11), Greece (6), Ireland (11), Italy (6), Luxembourg (2), the Netherlands (11), Norway (11), Portugal (11), and Sweden (11). For the full list of participating countries by survey round, see < https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/downloadwizard/ >.

**3000 Technicians and associate professionals
**4000 Clerks
**5000 Service workers, shop, market sales workers
**6000 Skilled agricultural and fishery workers
**7000 Craft and related trades workers
**8000 Plant and machine operators and assemblers
**9000 Elementary occupations

Table A: Populist Party Support by Occupational Group

	Populist vote share	Proportion of total population
All occupations	0.07	1
Routine skills	0.06	0.10
Plant and machine operators, and assemblers	0.09	0.07
Craft and related trades workers	0.09	0.11
Skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery workers	0.06	0.04
Service and sales workers	0.08	0.17
Clerical support workers (*reference group*)	0.07	0.10
Technicians and associate professionals	0.07	0.16
Professionals	0.05	0.16
Managers	0.06	0.08
Armed forces occupations	0.08	0.00

Source: European Social Survey, Waves 1-11. Rounding may lead to totals greater than 1.

Table B provides additional information about the educational coding, which is based on the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED), which is also used by the European Social Survey.

Table B: Populist Vote Share by Educational Group

	Populist vote share (including non-voters)	Proportion of total respondents
All educational levels	0.07	1
ES-ISCED I, less than lower secondary	0.05	0.13
ES-ISCED II, lower secondary (*reference group*)	0.09	0.18
ES-ISCED III, upper secondary	0.10	0.35
ES-ISCED IV, advanced vocational, sub-degree	0.09	0.11
ES-ISCED V, tertiary education, >= BA	0.06	0.23

Source: European Social Survey, Waves 1-11. Rounding may lead to totals greater than 1.

Appendix 2: Robustness Checks, Sensitivity Tests and Alternative Specifications of ESS Results

First, we examine several alternative model specifications. The first column of Table C reports results for the main multilevel specification used in the paper: a multilevel logistic model with a random intercept for country, year fixed effects, and standard errors clustered by country. Table C also presents two additional specifications. The second column reports results for the unemployment insurance replacement rate with random intercepts for both country and year, while columns 3-5 shows results with a random intercept for country-year (or country-survey wave). These alternative structures allow us to verify that the substantive results are not sensitive to hierarchical assumptions about data modelling.

As shown in Table D, the ICCs from these models indicate meaningful variation both across countries and over time within countries. We retain the simpler country-level model with year fixed effects as our main specification, as it provides a more parsimonious and interpretable baseline. However, it is notable that the main findings remain substantively unchanged for populist voting across the alternative specifications. This is not the case for far-left voting and far-right voting, which are not statistically significant in the three-level and country-year models.

In Tables E–G, we probe the robustness of the OLS fixed-effects models that include both country and year dummies. Table E subjects the results for our main model (the relationship between unemployment insurance generosity and populist voting) to a range of robustness checks. These include: (1) restricting the analysis to respondents who reported voting in the last election; (2) replacing the measure of immigration rates (which captures flows) with an indicator for the foreign-born population (which captures stock); (3) excluding the immigration variables; (4) excluding the occupational and education variables; (5) excluding Southern European countries (Spain, Portugal, Italy, and Greece); and (6) excluding Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden). Across all six models, the main finding holds: more generous unemployment insurance programs are associated with a lower likelihood of voting for a populist party.

Table F examines results using alternative indicators of labor market spending and different measures of unemployment insurance generosity, again with populist voting as the dependent variable. Columns 1 and 2 present results for passive and active labor market spending, respectively. Columns 3–6 use data from the Comparative Welfare Entitlements Project (CWEP) measures devised by Scruggs (2018).[8] Column 3 uses the replacement rate for a single person making the median wage (UE_RR_S100) while Column 4 multiplies this measure by the unemployment insurance coverage rate (ucovrate). This allows us to assess not only the generosity for those covered but the percent of the population that enjoys unemployment insurance protection (Vlandas & Halikiopoulou, 2022). Columns 5 and 6 use the CWEP replacement rate for a couple with two earners and two children (UE_RR_C10050) and this rate multiplied by the unemployment insurance coverage rate. In all six of the models, the negative relationship between labor market spending and the likelihood of voting populist is statistically significant at conventional levels (p < 0.05). This suggests that the observed negative correlation

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[8] Please note that CWEP does not code Luxembourg and only covers through 2020.

between unemployment and populist voting is robust to a range of different measures of labor market spending and unemployment insurance generosity.

Finally, Table G assesses whether the findings are robust to the inclusion of eight Eastern European countries for which OECD data are available: Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia, and the Slovak Republic. Together with the 16 western European countries analyzed in the paper, this expands the analysis to a total of 24 countries. For populist, far-right, and far-left voting, we examine both the UI replacement rate for a single person using the SIEDS indicator and the UI coverage–replacement rate product for a family using CWEP data (Scruggs, 2018). As shown in Table G, the main results for the UI replacement rate measures hold when these additional countries are included. For far-right and far-left parties, the negative relationship between unemployment insurance generosity and support for extremist parties becomes even stronger.

Table C, Alternative Specifications

	UI RR (Country and Year Intercepts)	UI RR - RW (Country and Year Intercepts)	UI RR - LW (Country and Year Intercepts)	UI RR (Country-Year Intercept)
Compensation	-1.214*** (0.000)	-0.589 (0.193)	-0.637 (0.229)	-0.719* (0.041)
Unemployment Rate	-0.483 (0.074)	-1.296 (0.139)	-0.758 (0.072)	-0.427* (0.045)
Labor Market Participation Rate	0.270 (0.267)	1.234* (0.017)	-0.576 (0.192)	0.134 (0.569)
Per capita income	-0.0511 (0.855)	-0.544 (0.590)	0.400 (0.581)	0.406 (0.134)
Inflation rate	-0.333 (0.195)	-0.349 (0.416)	-0.00992 (0.944)	-0.397 (0.296)
Manufacturing Employment (% of GDP)	-1.530* (0.018)	-2.673* (0.029)	-0.650 (0.207)	-0.789 (0.076)
Corruption Perception Index	-0.120 (0.762)	-0.858 (0.204)	0.250 (0.515)	-0.120 (0.769)
Immigration inflow (% of population)	-0.254 (0.430)	-0.381 (0.279)	-1.116** (0.009)	-0.283 (0.449)
Male	0.219*** (0.000)	0.260*** (0.000)	0.0627 (0.201)	0.219*** (0.000)
Age: 30's	0.0647 (0.127)	0.235* (0.030)	-0.110 (0.122)	0.0644 (0.129)
Age: 40's	0.102 (0.077)	0.273*** (0.000)	-0.184*** (0.000)	0.102 (0.078)
Age: 50's	0.0435 (0.464)	0.0827 (0.355)	0.0286 (0.649)	0.0436 (0.463)
Age: 60's	-0.0376 (0.483)	0.0896 (0.331)	-0.124 (0.219)	-0.0371 (0.491)
Age: 70's	-0.225* (0.019)	-0.161** (0.004)	-0.0741 (0.353)	-0.225* (0.019)
Education: Less than secondary	-0.225 (0.079)	-0.228 (0.068)	-0.0639 (0.664)	-0.228 (0.076)
Education: Upper secondary	0.180* (0.018)	0.120 (0.073)	0.319* (0.014)	0.181* (0.018)

Education: Adv. vocational	0.288 (0.086)	0.0356 (0.723)	0.568** (0.008)	0.289 (0.085)
Education: Tertiary	-0.0184 (0.925)	-0.406** (0.005)	0.576** (0.002)	-0.0182 (0.926)
Routine skills	-0.0556 (0.437)	0.0284 (0.814)	-0.146* (0.030)	-0.0547 (0.444)
Machinist	0.107* (0.050)	0.153 (0.156)	-0.0293 (0.733)	0.107* (0.050)
Craft Worker	0.0685 (0.177)	0.123 (0.168)	-0.0581 (0.664)	0.0688 (0.175)
Skilled Agriculturalist	0.0221 (0.886)	0.0517 (0.816)	0.0215 (0.691)	0.0224 (0.884)
Service Worker	0.0366 (0.342)	0.0652 (0.178)	-0.0831 (0.462)	0.0370 (0.337)
Technician	0.108 (0.071)	-0.0626 (0.494)	0.146 (0.193)	0.108 (0.070)
Professional	0.0377 (0.775)	-0.198 (0.129)	0.145 (0.100)	0.0379 (0.774)
Manager	0.0283 (0.824)	-0.00287 (0.976)	-0.107 (0.636)	0.0276 (0.829)
Army	-0.118 (0.566)	0.280** (0.005)	-0.328 (0.401)	-0.119 (0.563)
Trade Union Member	0.385* (0.018)	0.169** (0.004)	0.842*** (0.000)	0.384* (0.018)
City	0.127 (0.337)	-0.164*** (0.000)	0.344*** (0.000)	0.127 (0.339)
Suburb	0.000138 (0.998)	-0.0786 (0.333)	0.0824 (0.326)	-0.000919 (0.983)
Village	-0.0340 (0.638)	0.0731 (0.242)	-0.0410 (0.697)	-0.0336 (0.643)
Farm	0.00522 (0.976)	0.216* (0.039)	-0.192 (0.087)	0.00555 (0.974)
Positive view about immigration	-0.154*** (0.000)	-0.351*** (0.000)	0.119*** (0.000)	-0.154*** (0.000)
Prior Unemployment Experience	0.192* (0.019)	0.0223 (0.750)	0.403*** (0.000)	0.193* (0.019)
Economic Situation: Coping	0.186 (0.135)	0.0148 (0.885)	0.365*** (0.000)	0.186 (0.137)
Economic Situation: Difficult	0.241 (0.177)	-0.0196 (0.918)	0.516*** (0.000)	0.239 (0.180)
Economic Situation: Very Difficult	0.101 (0.636)	-0.277 (0.219)	0.492* (0.028)	0.0984 (0.644)
Constant	-3.371*** (0.000)	-3.937*** (0.000)	-6.023*** (0.000)	-3.181*** (0.000)
var(_cons[country2])	1.269 (0.142)	3.635 (0.075)	4.011 (0.126)	
var(_cons[country2>year])	0.425* (0.048)	1.384 (0.058)	0.688 (0.279)	
var(_cons[country_year])				1.055 (0.075)

Observations	108931	108931	108931	107691

p-values in parentheses
* *p* < 0.05, ** *p* < 0.01, *** *p* < 0.001

Table D: Residual Intraclass correlation calculations

Model	Level	ICC	Standard Error	95% confidence	
Country-intercepts	country	0.5470311	0.192389	0.2086497	0.8468944
County-year intercepts	country_year	0.2428306	0.1031154	0.0965274	0.4904944
Country intercepts nested in years	country	0.2546521	0.1250075	0.0858958	0.5540143
Country intercepts nested in years	year|country	0.3399581	0.1290089	0.1430306	0.613816

Table E, Determinants of Populist Voting, Robustness Checks

	UI RR - excluding non-voters (FE)	UI RR - with Foreign Born (FE)	UI RR – Negative Immigration views only (FE)	UI RR - w/out Occupation or Education (FE)	UI RR - Excl. Southern Europe (FE)	UI RR - Excl. Scandinavia (FE)
Compensation	-0.145** (0.002)	-0.236*** (0.000)	-0.0890* (0.033)	-0.0361* (0.038)	-0.221*** (0.000)	-0.110*** (0.000)
Unemployment Rate	-0.0455* (0.018)	-0.0132 (0.346)	-0.00770 (0.842)	-0.0383** (0.006)	-0.0366** (0.003)	-0.0414** (0.002)
Labor Market Participation Rate	0.00449 (0.915)	0.0156 (0.206)	0.0305 (0.567)	0.0284 (0.157)	0.00106 (0.950)	-0.0276 (0.262)
Per capita income	-0.0586 (0.199)	-0.0690** (0.005)	0.110 (0.069)	-0.0976* (0.018)	-0.0760 (0.221)	0.0770 (0.173)
Inflation rate	-0.00838 (0.749)	-0.0118 (0.409)	0.0129 (0.438)	-0.00277 (0.848)	-0.0146 (0.257)	-0.00700 (0.772)
Manufacturing Employment (% of GDP)	-0.161** (0.003)	-0.134** (0.006)	-0.112 (0.063)	-0.0872* (0.017)	-0.137** (0.002)	-0.207*** (0.000)
Corruption Perception Index	0.0817* (0.024)	0.130*** (0.000)	0.00740 (0.885)	0.0209 (0.407)	0.0936** (0.006)	0.0284 (0.194)
Immigration inflow (% of population)	-0.0163 (0.415)	--	-0.0648* (0.017)	-0.00126 (0.902)	-0.000852 (0.877)	-0.0512 (0.089)
Male	0.0225*** (0.000)	0.0182*** (0.000)	0.0145** (0.010)	0.0165*** (0.000)	0.0168*** (0.000)	0.0148*** (0.000)
Age: 30's	-0.00275 (0.620)	0.00895* (0.036)	0.0121 (0.299)	0.0121** (0.001)	0.00261 (0.485)	0.00429 (0.232)
Age: 40's	-0.00619 (0.362)	0.00895 (0.250)	0.0247* (0.038)	0.0157* (0.016)	0.00635 (0.356)	0.00822 (0.182)
Age: 50's	-0.0305** (0.003)	0.00392 (0.388)	0.0161* (0.029)	0.0123** (0.006)	0.00966** (0.005)	0.00333 (0.507)

Age: 60's	-0.0492*** (0.000)	-0.00349 (0.342)	0.00716 (0.438)	0.00286 (0.444)	0.00227 (0.565)	-0.00380 (0.486)
Age: 70's	-0.0235* (0.021)	-0.0177* (0.018)	-0.0276*** (0.000)	-0.0195** (0.007)	-0.0102 (0.083)	-0.0196* (0.050)
Education: Less than secondary	-0.0230 (0.113)	-0.0118 (0.160)	-0.0139 (0.333)	--	-0.00280 (0.733)	-0.0119 (0.186)
Education: Upper secondary	-0.0121 (0.116)	0.0130 (0.118)	0.0229* (0.025)	--	0.00783 (0.383)	0.0136 (0.073)
Education: Adv. vocational	-0.0106 (0.516)	0.0241 (0.147)	0.0248* (0.047)	--	0.0219 (0.219)	0.0228 (0.139)
Education: Tertiary	-0.0328 (0.063)	-0.00156 (0.892)	0.00640 (0.624)	--	0.000892 (0.962)	0.00150 (0.915)
Routine skills	0.0180 (0.054)	-0.00177 (0.784)	-0.00591 (0.443)	--	-0.00271 (0.520)	-0.00228 (0.714)
Machinist	0.0344** (0.003)	0.00923 (0.335)	0.00851 (0.319)	--	0.0151 (0.194)	0.00618 (0.274)
Craft Worker	0.0209* (0.024)	0.0100 (0.112)	0.00470 (0.403)	--	0.0128 (0.103)	0.00560 (0.250)
Skilled Agriculturalist	0.00354 (0.856)	0.00473 (0.656)	0.00441 (0.796)	--	0.00769 (0.577)	0.00796 (0.504)
Service Worker	0.0208** (0.002)	0.00243 (0.381)	-0.00263 (0.626)	--	0.00289 (0.313)	0.00387 (0.214)
Technician	0.00501 (0.460)	0.0105 (0.130)	0.00597 (0.332)	--	0.00636 (0.224)	0.00997 (0.067)
Professional	-0.00445 (0.776)	0.00301 (0.790)	-0.000583 (0.967)	--	0.00258 (0.819)	0.00550 (0.583)
Manager	0.00383 (0.774)	-0.00197 (0.757)	0.0127 (0.179)	--	0.00433 (0.627)	0.00479 (0.592)
Army	-0.0186 (0.306)	-0.00980 (0.233)	-0.0117 (0.569)	--	0.00452 (0.731)	-0.00922 (0.605)
Trade Union Member	0.0283 (0.173)	0.0300* (0.012)	0.0294*** (0.001)	0.0303* (0.019)	0.0359* (0.014)	0.0307* (0.035)
City	0.0168 (0.248)	0.00614 (0.547)	0.000973 (0.796)	0.00788 (0.351)	0.0152 (0.130)	0.0113 (0.260)
Suburb	-0.00107 (0.839)	-0.00491 (0.230)	-0.000134 (0.985)	0.000689 (0.848)	-0.000627 (0.884)	0.000531 (0.896)
Village	-0.00697 (0.371)	-0.00306 (0.663)	-0.00662 (0.452)	-0.00273 (0.598)	0.00144 (0.864)	-0.00221 (0.733)
Farm	-0.00439 (0.780)	0.00500 (0.614)	-0.00338 (0.909)	0.0000250 (0.998)	0.0159 (0.083)	-0.00441 (0.812)
Positive view about immigration	-0.0204*** (0.000)	-0.0152*** (0.000)	-0.0180*** (0.000)	-0.0109*** (0.000)	-0.0139** (0.003)	-0.0111*** (0.001)
Prior Unemployment Experience	0.0307* (0.014)	0.0148 (0.051)	0.00684 (0.287)	0.0164*** (0.000)	0.0175* (0.020)	0.0134 (0.073)
Economic Situation: Coping	0.0247* (0.045)	0.0134 (0.173)	0.00890 (0.477)	0.0122* (0.031)	0.0172 (0.082)	0.0145 (0.139)

Economic Situation: Difficult	0.0620** (0.008)	0.0201 (0.152)	0.0175 (0.271)	0.0134 (0.121)	0.0290* (0.026)	0.0205 (0.133)
Economic Situation: Very Difficult	0.0618* (0.046)	0.00763 (0.477)	0.00661 (0.753)	0.00730 (0.393)	0.0158 (0.352)	0.0114 (0.480)
Foreign born (% of population)	--	1.14e-08* (0.020)	--	--	--	--
Constant	0.196** (0.001)	0.0396 (0.359)	0.151*** (0.000)	0.107*** (0.000)	0.0193 (0.703)	0.0702 (0.063)
Observations	73721	88762	56036	150324	86349	82475
Adjusted R^2	0.152	0.074	0.101	0.068	0.039	0.071

p-values in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table F, Alternative Measures of LMP Spending and UI Generosity

	Passive LMP spend (FE)	Active LMP spend (FE)	UI RR, Single (CWEP)	UI RR* Coverage, Single (CWEP)	UI RR, Family (CWEP)	UI RR* Coverage, Family (CWEP)
Compensation	-0.0639* (0.011)	-0.0242** (0.002)	-1.052*** (0.000)	-1.123*** (0.000)	-0.835* (0.037)	-0.954* (0.012)
Unemployment Rate	0.0143 (0.542)	-0.00131 (0.947)	-0.0339* (0.034)	-0.0524** (0.001)	-0.0163 (0.511)	-0.0304 (0.226)
Labor Market Participation Rate	0.0100 (0.731)	0.00637 (0.854)	0.00781 (0.763)	0.0161 (0.435)	0.0228 (0.489)	0.0226 (0.376)
Per capita income	-0.107 (0.121)	0.0160 (0.789)	-0.0119 (0.723)	-0.0582 (0.165)	0.0178 (0.787)	0.00296 (0.968)
Inflation rate	-0.0187 (0.273)	-0.0225 (0.129)	-0.0258 (0.207)	-0.0232 (0.207)	-0.0293 (0.069)	-0.0365 (0.054)
Manufacturing Employment (% of GDP)	-0.0633 (0.230)	-0.183*** (0.001)	-0.167*** (0.000)	-0.136*** (0.000)	-0.207*** (0.000)	-0.155*** (0.001)
Corruption Perception Index	0.0387 (0.053)	0.0720** (0.005)	0.0676** (0.006)	0.0757*** (0.001)	0.0521* (0.011)	0.0377* (0.018)
Immigration inflow (% of population)	0.00253 (0.830)	0.0158 (0.251)	-0.0169 (0.467)	-0.00302 (0.879)	0.00374 (0.834)	0.0122 (0.529)
Male	0.0166*** (0.000)	0.0167*** (0.000)	0.0176*** (0.000)	0.0176*** (0.000)	0.0176*** (0.000)	0.0165*** (0.000)
Age: 30's	0.00552 (0.132)	0.00569 (0.123)	0.00549 (0.155)	0.00548 (0.155)	0.00540 (0.158)	0.00461 (0.215)
Age: 40's	0.00884 (0.142)	0.00879 (0.144)	0.0109* (0.032)	0.0108* (0.032)	0.0108* (0.032)	0.0107* (0.032)
Age: 50's	0.00475 (0.289)	0.00461 (0.301)	0.00410 (0.422)	0.00408 (0.424)	0.00399 (0.435)	0.00620 (0.249)
Age: 60's	-0.00218 (0.655)	-0.00236 (0.628)	-0.000754 (0.900)	-0.000856 (0.887)	-0.00103 (0.865)	-0.000383 (0.949)
Age: 70's	-0.0171* (0.045)	-0.0170* (0.046)	-0.0196* (0.018)	-0.0196* (0.017)	-0.0196* (0.018)	-0.0215* (0.011)

Education: Less than secondary	-0.0134 (0.106)	-0.0130 (0.114)	-0.0120 (0.145)	-0.0117 (0.154)	-0.0118 (0.149)	-0.0134 (0.141)
Education: Upper secondary	0.0130 (0.058)	0.0132 (0.054)	0.0126 (0.066)	0.0126 (0.066)	0.0124 (0.070)	0.0125 (0.070)
Education: Adv. vocational	0.0210 (0.126)	0.0208 (0.133)	0.0122 (0.175)	0.0125 (0.161)	0.0118 (0.193)	0.0116 (0.226)
Education: Tertiary	-0.00125 (0.922)	-0.00108 (0.932)	-0.000991 (0.934)	-0.000869 (0.942)	-0.00134 (0.911)	-0.00236 (0.853)
Routine skills	-0.00306 (0.599)	-0.00264 (0.647)	-0.00641 (0.253)	-0.00624 (0.265)	-0.00683 (0.221)	-0.00792 (0.158)
Machinist	0.00946 (0.123)	0.00938 (0.125)	0.0110 (0.067)	0.0108 (0.069)	0.0110 (0.068)	0.00948 (0.076)
Craft Worker	0.00626 (0.162)	0.00643 (0.152)	0.00571 (0.205)	0.00571 (0.206)	0.00555 (0.213)	0.00525 (0.213)
Skilled Agriculturalist	0.00657 (0.575)	0.00643 (0.582)	-0.000572 (0.953)	-0.000784 (0.936)	-0.000432 (0.965)	-0.00281 (0.788)
Service Worker	0.00426 (0.152)	0.00430 (0.148)	0.00466 (0.114)	0.00466 (0.114)	0.00463 (0.117)	0.00297 (0.418)
Technician	0.00867 (0.091)	0.00873 (0.087)	0.00664 (0.149)	0.00652 (0.157)	0.00677 (0.140)	0.00699 (0.129)
Professional	0.00211 (0.831)	0.00209 (0.833)	-0.00206 (0.764)	-0.00212 (0.756)	-0.00175 (0.797)	-0.00163 (0.813)
Manager	0.00161 (0.852)	0.00169 (0.846)	-0.000903 (0.898)	-0.000762 (0.913)	-0.000773 (0.912)	-0.00320 (0.705)
Army	-0.00837 (0.601)	-0.00816 (0.612)	-0.00508 (0.785)	-0.00482 (0.795)	-0.00450 (0.808)	-0.00742 (0.702)
Trade Union Member	0.0299* (0.021)	0.0296* (0.023)	0.0290* (0.032)	0.0289* (0.033)	0.0293* (0.029)	0.0320* (0.012)
City	0.00937 (0.329)	0.00922 (0.339)	0.00582 (0.429)	0.00590 (0.421)	0.00580 (0.430)	0.00546 (0.462)
Suburb	0.000314 (0.926)	0.000390 (0.908)	0.00317 (0.176)	0.00333 (0.161)	0.00316 (0.181)	0.00348 (0.150)
Village	-0.00234 (0.695)	-0.00242 (0.684)	-0.00112 (0.850)	-0.00106 (0.858)	-0.00119 (0.839)	-0.00184 (0.753)
Farm	0.00138 (0.923)	0.00118 (0.934)	0.000321 (0.983)	0.000254 (0.987)	0.000186 (0.990)	-0.00146 (0.926)
Positive view about immigration	-0.0123*** (0.000)	-0.0124*** (0.000)	-0.0122*** (0.001)	-0.0122*** (0.001)	-0.0122*** (0.001)	-0.0120*** (0.001)
Prior Unemployment Experience	0.0144* (0.025)	0.0141* (0.029)	0.0123* (0.019)	0.0122* (0.020)	0.0122* (0.020)	0.0134** (0.008)
Economic Situation: Coping	0.0132 (0.134)	0.0129 (0.147)	0.00720 (0.233)	0.00723 (0.229)	0.00714 (0.237)	0.00982 (0.099)
Economic Situation: Difficult	0.0192 (0.122)	0.0186 (0.139)	0.0138 (0.211)	0.0137 (0.213)	0.0141 (0.197)	0.0160 (0.131)
Economic Situation: Very Difficult	0.00866 (0.563)	0.00787 (0.604)	0.00585 (0.687)	0.00574 (0.692)	0.00569 (0.695)	0.00993 (0.467)
Constant	0.150** (0.009)	0.0505 (0.137)	0.749*** (0.000)	0.673*** (0.000)	0.735* (0.028)	0.698** (0.009)
Observations	113184	113184	104737	104737	104737	104737
Adjusted R^2	0.067	0.067	0.072	0.073	0.072	0.070

p-values in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table G, Determinants of Populist Voting, West + East Europe

	Single UI RR (FE)	Single UI RR - RW (FE)	Single UI RR - LW (FE)	Family UI RR*Coverage (FE)	Family UI RR*Coverage – Far right (FE)	Family UI RR*Coverage – Far left (FE)
Compensation	-0.0906** (0.004)	-0.0337 (0.182)	-0.0266*** (0.000)	-0.725** (0.008)	-0.321 (0.067)	-0.272*** (0.001)
Unemployment Rate	-0.00809 (0.781)	-0.0178 (0.470)	-0.000312 (0.946)	-0.0370 (0.101)	-0.0366 (0.073)	-0.00769 (0.137)
Labor Market Participation Rate	0.0191 (0.595)	0.0794* (0.019)	-0.0186* (0.014)	0.0755 (0.098)	0.0697* (0.037)	-0.0147 (0.168)
Per capita income	0.0932* (0.036)	-0.0146 (0.693)	0.0903*** (0.000)	-0.00932 (0.919)	-0.0343 (0.647)	0.0473** (0.008)
Inflation rate	0.00447 (0.700)	0.0108 (0.377)	-0.00676* (0.038)	-0.0453 (0.104)	-0.0348 (0.116)	0.000345 (0.927)
Manufacturing Employment (% of GDP)	-0.0862* (0.038)	0.0382 (0.295)	-0.0364** (0.002)	-0.167** (0.004)	-0.0412 (0.201)	-0.0678*** (0.000)
Corruption Perception Index	-0.0332 (0.467)	-0.0936** (0.002)	0.000503 (0.938)	0.00730 (0.801)	-0.0377 (0.243)	-0.00837 (0.339)
Net immigration (% of population)	-0.0541* (0.026)	-0.00600 (0.698)	-0.0272*** (0.001)	-0.00270 (0.897)	0.000531 (0.973)	-0.0140** (0.007)
Male	0.0147*** (0.000)	0.0105*** (0.000)	0.00145 (0.572)	0.0157*** (0.000)	0.00879*** (0.001)	0.00188 (0.567)
Age: 30's	0.00715 (0.071)	0.0106** (0.004)	-0.00428 (0.147)	0.00847 (0.083)	0.0109** (0.007)	-0.00360 (0.206)
Age: 40's	0.0167* (0.045)	0.0152** (0.002)	-0.00630** (0.004)	0.0162* (0.039)	0.0154** (0.003)	-0.00608** (0.002)
Age: 50's	0.0143* (0.029)	0.00855 (0.083)	0.00399 (0.185)	0.0126 (0.119)	0.00805 (0.215)	0.00403 (0.218)
Age: 60's	0.0111 (0.208)	0.00853 (0.152)	-0.000854 (0.830)	0.00740 (0.432)	0.00853 (0.259)	-0.00194 (0.688)
Age: 70's	-0.0177* (0.013)	-0.00595 (0.055)	-0.00315 (0.155)	-0.0214** (0.004)	-0.00587* (0.012)	-0.00659*** (0.001)
Education: Less than secondary	-0.0225* (0.047)	-0.00990* (0.043)	-0.00815 (0.136)	-0.0181 (0.079)	-0.00795 (0.090)	-0.00490 (0.224)
Education: Upper secondary	0.00913 (0.174)	0.00675 (0.065)	0.00570 (0.170)	0.00879 (0.210)	0.00635 (0.112)	0.00639* (0.028)
Education: Adv. vocational	0.0172 (0.177)	0.00179 (0.611)	0.0172 (0.093)	0.00834 (0.378)	0.000508 (0.893)	0.0136* (0.047)
Education: Tertiary	-0.00606 (0.619)	-0.00813 (0.058)	0.0170* (0.045)	-0.00582 (0.637)	-0.00804 (0.081)	0.0192* (0.027)
Routine skills	-0.00478 (0.424)	-0.000540 (0.925)	-0.00414 (0.264)	-0.00816 (0.109)	-0.00216 (0.630)	-0.00720* (0.016)
Machinist	0.00840 (0.050)	0.00947 (0.052)	-0.000770 (0.849)	0.00991* (0.043)	0.0137** (0.008)	-0.00491 (0.113)
Craft Worker	0.00263 (0.505)	0.00355 (0.344)	-0.00132 (0.780)	0.00247 (0.548)	0.00514 (0.176)	-0.00348 (0.462)
Skilled Agriculturalist	0.0162 (0.287)	0.000159 (0.983)	0.00504 (0.386)	0.0151 (0.401)	-0.000133 (0.987)	0.000838 (0.860)
Service Worker	0.00185 (0.632)	0.00257 (0.193)	-0.00329 (0.456)	0.00244 (0.476)	0.00333 (0.162)	-0.00496 (0.289)
Technician	0.00826 (0.058)	-0.000413 (0.896)	0.00616 (0.211)	0.00733 (0.081)	0.000141 (0.967)	0.00340 (0.343)

Professional	0.000949 (0.920)	-0.00529 (0.319)	0.00595 (0.156)	-0.00105 (0.875)	-0.00548 (0.323)	0.00331 (0.225)
Manager	-0.00292 (0.713)	-0.00238 (0.490)	-0.00574 (0.425)	-0.00264 (0.714)	-0.00105 (0.727)	-0.00738 (0.376)
Army	-0.0113 (0.440)	0.00561 (0.308)	-0.00928 (0.408)	-0.00927 (0.602)	0.0135* (0.048)	-0.0110 (0.397)
Trade Union Member	0.0312** (0.002)	0.00629 (0.061)	0.0331*** (0.001)	0.0317** (0.005)	0.00761* (0.014)	0.0361*** (0.000)
City	0.00321 (0.734)	-0.00686 (0.050)	0.0122 (0.070)	0.00210 (0.778)	-0.00523* (0.019)	0.0123* (0.027)
Suburb	-0.000511 (0.858)	-0.00292 (0.216)	0.00296 (0.328)	0.00237 (0.281)	-0.00147 (0.588)	0.00477 (0.117)
Village	0.00390 (0.596)	0.00604 (0.140)	0.0000201 (0.994)	0.000591 (0.916)	0.00400 (0.151)	0.000195 (0.948)
Farm	-0.000366 (0.979)	0.0194** (0.008)	-0.00791* (0.016)	-0.00509 (0.743)	0.0145 (0.072)	-0.00593 (0.063)
Positive view about immigration	-0.0111*** (0.000)	-0.0127*** (0.000)	0.00425*** (0.000)	-0.0117*** (0.000)	-0.0125*** (0.000)	0.00422** (0.005)
Prior Unemployment Experience	0.00917 (0.235)	-0.00272 (0.463)	0.0157** (0.001)	0.00889 (0.178)	-0.00335 (0.340)	0.0165*** (0.000)
Economic Situation: Coping	0.0157* (0.032)	0.00274 (0.447)	0.0153** (0.002)	0.0105 (0.056)	-0.000729 (0.828)	0.0140*** (0.001)
Economic Situation: Difficult	0.0256* (0.019)	0.00571 (0.510)	0.0205** (0.002)	0.0205* (0.042)	0.00239 (0.766)	0.0186** (0.001)
Economic Situation: Very Difficult	0.0153 (0.196)	-0.00373 (0.661)	0.0232** (0.009)	0.0108 (0.383)	-0.00958 (0.312)	0.0198* (0.033)
Constant	0.111*** (0.000)	0.112*** (0.000)	-0.0225 (0.160)	0.579** (0.002)	0.316* (0.012)	0.155** (0.002)
Observations	160766	160766	160766	116614	116614	116614
Adjusted R^2	0.083	0.116	0.037	0.079	0.089	0.035

p-values in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Appendix 3: Categorization of Parties

Country	Party Abbreviation	Full Party Name	Populist Party?	Radical Party?
Austria	FPÖ	Freedom Party of Austria	Populist	Right
	BZÖ	Alliance for the Future of Austria	Populist	Right (-2008)
	Martin	Hans Peter Martin's List	Populist	No
	TS	Team Stronach	Populist	No
	Pilz	NOW – Pilz List	Populist	No
Belgium	N-VA	New Flemish Alliance	Populist	Right
	VB	Flemish Interest (*Vlaams Belang*)	Populist	Right
	PVDA/PTB	Workers' Party of Belgium	No	Left
	FN	National Front	Populist	Right
	LDD	List Dedecker	Populist	No
	PP	Peoples' Party	Populist	Right
Denmark	En-O	Red-Green Alliance	No	Left
	DF	Danish People's Party	Populist	Right
	FRP	Progress Party	Populist	Right
	SF	Socialist People's Party	No	Left
Finland	PS	Finns Party (*formerly True Finns*)	Populist	Right
	VAS	Left Alliance	No	Left
France	DLR/DLF	Republic Arise (*Debout la France*)	Populist	Right
	FN	National Front	Populist	Left
	FI	Unsubmissive France (*Le France Insoumise*)	Populist	Left
	PCF/FdG	French Communist Party	No	Left
	LO	Workers' Struggle (*Lutte ouvrière*)	No	Left
	MPF	Movement for France	No	Right
	RPF	Rally for France (*Rassemblement pour la France*)	No	Right
	Reconquete	Reconquest	Populist	Right
Germany	PDS/Linke	The Left (*Die Linke*)	Populist	Left
	AfD	Alternative for Germany	Populist	Right
	Republikaner	Republicans	Populist	Right
Greece	Syriza	Coalition of the Radical Left	Populist	Left
	ANEL	Independent Greeks	Populist	No
	GD	Golden Dawn	No	Right
	KKE	Communist Party of Greece	No	Left
	LAOS	Popular Orthodox Rally	Populist	Right
	SYN	The Coalition of the Left	Populist	Left
	DIKKI	Democratic Social Movement	Populist	Left
	MeRa25	European Realistic Disobedience Front	Populist	Left
	EL	Greek Solution	Populist	Right

Ireland	SF	We Ourselves (*Sinn Féin*)	Populist	Left
	SP	Socialist Party	No	Left
	WP	Workers' Party	No	Left
Italy	FdL	Brothers of Italy	Populist	Right
	Lega	Northern League *(Lega Nord)*	Populist	Right
	M5S	Five Star Movement	Populist	No
	AN	National Alliance	No	Right
	LD-FT	The Right - Tricolor Flame	No	Right
	LeU	Free and Equals	No	Left
	IdV	Di Pietro's list - Italy of Values	Populist	No
	PdCl	Party of the Italian Communists	No	Left
	PRC	Communist Refoundation Party	No	Left
Luxembourg	ADR	Alternative Democratic Reform Party	Populist	No
	Dei Lenk	The Left	No	Left
	KPL	Communist Party of Luxembourg	No	Left
	NB	National Movement	No	Right
Netherlands	BBB	Farmer-Citizen Movement	Populist	Populist
	FVD	Forum for Democracy	Populist	Right
	PVV	Party for Freedom	Populist	Right
	CD	Centre Democrats	Populist	Right
	LPF	List Pim Fortuyn	Populist	No
	LN	Livable Netherlands	Populist	No
	SP	Socialist Party	Populist (- 2002)	Left (- 2002)
Norway	FrP	Progress Party	Populist	Right
	SV	Socialist Left Party	No	Left
	Kp	Coastal Party	Yes	No
	Rödt	Red Party	Populist (since 2012)	Left
Portugal	BE	Left Bloc	No	Left
	CDU(PEV & PCP)	Unitary Democratic Coalition	No	Left
	Chega	Enough	Populist	Right
Spain	IU	United Left	No	Left
	Podemos	We Can	Populist	Left
	Unidas Podemos	United We Can	Populist	Left
	Vox	Voice	Populist	Right
	EH-Bildu	Basque Country Unite	No	Left
	BNG	Galician Nationalist Bloc	No	Left
Sweden	V (VPK)	Left Party	No	Left
	SD	Sweden Democrats	Populist	Right
	NyD	New Democracy	Populist	No

Switzerland	SVP	Swiss Democrats	Populist	Right
	LdT	Ticino League	Populist	Right
	PdA	Swiss Labor Party	No	Left
	EDU	Federal Democratic Union	No	Right

Source: Rooduijn et al. (2023). Available at < https://popu-list.org.

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